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ATTENTION DEFICIT HYPERACTIVITY DISORDER: REFRAMING “DEFICIT” 
AS CREATIVE STRENGTH 
 
By Alexandra Marian Beaven 
 
 
Creative ideas are those that are both novel and useful. Creativity is considered to be a 
valuable social resource, which has supported the development of society in myriad 
domains. It has been suggested that behavioural indicators of creativity overlap with 
symptoms of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). Indeed, there is some 
preliminary evidence to suggest that individuals with ADHD may be more creative than 
individuals without ADHD. The first chapter of this thesis outlines the relevant research 
and theory and presents the ‘creative advantage hypothesis’. Specifically it is argued 
that defocused attention in individuals with ADHD increases the likelihood of unusual 
associations forming, thus increasing the likelihood of creative responses. The potential 
mediating roles of inhibition and delay aversion are also discussed. 
 
  The second chapter of this thesis describes a study designed to test predictions of the 
creative  advantage  hypothesis.  Parents  of  pupils  in  Year  8  were  asked  to  rate  their 
child’s level of inattentiveness and hyperactivity. Sixty six pupils completed a measure 
of  figural  creativity,  inhibition  and  delay  aversion  in  school.  ADHD  symptoms 
predicted creativity scores on one aspect of creativity, originality, and this effect was 
found  in  boys  only.  Inhibition  and  delay  aversion  were  not  found  to  mediate  the 
relationship  between  ADHD  symptomology  and  creativity  in  boys.  Limitations  and 
implications for Educational Psychologists and teachers are also discussed.       4 
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Chapter 1: Is there a relationship between creativity and symptoms of Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder? 
 
Abstract 
 Creativity supports the progression of knowledge in society. Within the burgeoning 
literature,  a number of  definitions  of creativity have been suggested, although most 
specify a need for creative ideas to be both novel and functional. It has been suggested 
that  behavioural  traits  associated  with  creativity  overlap  with  aspects  of  Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD; Cramond, 1994). This paper critically reviews 
the relevant research surrounding creativity and ADHD in order to explore the validity 
of such claims. This review attempts to provide a coherent synthesis of the literature, in 
the form of the ‘creative advantage’ hypothesis. Specifically, it is argued that cognitive 
factors  common  to  both  creativity  and  ADHD,  predispose  individuals  with  ADHD 
towards creative thought.  In seeking to reframe aspects of ADHD symptomology as 
sources  of  potential  creative  strength,  this  paper  consciously  adopts  a  positive 
psychology perspective (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000).   
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Overview 
This literature review will explore the putative relationship between creativity and 
ADHD symptomology. The paper will begin by defining creativity before considering 
the role of creativity in education. A number of explanatory models of creativity will 
then be presented, culminating in a discussion on the role of neuropsychological 
functions in creativity. The paper will then present a critical analysis of studies 
exploring the relationship between creativity and ADHD.  A discussion of prominent 
theories of ADHD will then follow in an attempt to account for these findings and the 
“creative advantage hypothesis” of ADHD will then be presented. Specifically, it is 
suggested that individuals with ADHD may be predisposed to creative thought, given an 
overlap in cognitive mechanisms common to both ADHD symptomology and creative 
behaviour. In attempting to reframe aspects of ADHD (such as inattentiveness and 
inhibitory deficits) in terms of potential strength, the author consciously adopts a 
positive psychology perspective (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000).    
 Although it is recognised that adopting a categorical perspective on ADHD has 
practical benefits for clinicians in terms of ensuring equitable access to scarce resources 
(e.g. medication), this paper adopts a dimensional view of  ADHD, which places ADHD 
symptomology on a continuum. Within this ontological framework, individuals with 
ADHD are viewed as quantitatively, rather than qualitatively different to those without 
a diagnosis of ADHD. For this reason, the phrase “ADHD symptomology” will be used 
throughout this paper to refer to traits such as inattentiveness and 
hyperactivity/impulsivity. Therefore, studies utilising community selected samples will 
be considered in this review alongside studies where participants have a medical 
diagnosis of ADHD.  
 
1.0 What is creativity?  
The ability to be creative is believed to be the “cornerstone of what makes us 
human” (Dietrich & Kanso, 2010, p. 822) and is therefore of great social significance 
(Guildford, 1950).  Indeed, the impact of creative thought has been implicated in myriad 
domains. For example, creativity is believed to be a vital component of scientific 
discovery (Simonton, 2003); a key driver in organisational productivity (Bharadwaj & 
Menon, 2000) and even a facet of sporting expertise (Memmert, 2007). In the words of 
Dietrich and Kanso (2010): “all progress and innovation depend on our ability to change 
existing thinking patterns, break with the present, and build something new” (p. 822).       18 
 
 On an intuitive level, the notion of creativity is somewhat nebulous. This may 
explain why the study of creativity was relatively neglected by researchers prior to 
Guilford’s (1950) presidential address to the American Psychological Association. In 
his address, Guilford (1950) lamented the relative dearth of research into creativity at 
that time and emphasised the need to operationalise creativity in terms of a number of 
factors such as novelty, fluency and flexibility of thought. Guilford (1967) also 
distinguished between two forms of mental processes: convergent and divergent 
thinking, which have shaped the nature of subsequent creativity research. According to 
Hennesey and Amabile (2010) convergent thinking requires individuals to find a single 
‘correct’ solution to a problem and involves “narrowing possibilities to a workable 
solution” (p.579).  By contrast, divergent thinking requires individuals to consider 
multiple solutions to an open ended problem and “mak(e)  unexpected combinations, 
recognizing links among remote associates, transforming information into unexpected 
forms” (Cropley, 2006, p. 391). It is thought that tests of divergent thinking can be a 
useful indicator of creative potential (Runco & Acar, 2010). Although divergent 
thinking is often used as synonym for creative thinking in the literature, it is important 
to recognise that creativity also involves convergent thinking. For example, it has been 
suggested that convergent thinking may be helpful in validating the usefulness of a 
novel idea and ensuring that it is fit for purpose (Cropley, 2006).  
Researchers differ in their conceptualisations of creativity, although many 
definitions in the literature highlight the need for a creative product to be both novel and 
useful (Plucker, Beghetto & Dow, 2004). Finke (1996) calls such products examples of 
“creative realism”; outcomes which are innovative yet realistic. Such ideas show 
evidence of “imaginative divergence” (p. 391) in addition to “structural connectedness” 
to “established principles” and concepts (Finke, 1996 p. 391). Plucker et al. (2004) 
conclude that the following definition of creativity captures the general consensus 
within the literature: “Creativity is the interaction among aptitude, process, and 
environment by which an individual or group produces a perceptible product that is both 
novel and useful as determined within a social context” (p. 90).   
This section began by highlighting the importance of creativity to society. It 
seems logical to suggest then that as the citizens of tomorrow, creativity should be 
nurtured in young people.  
.  
       19 
 
1.1. Creativity in education 
 The importance of fostering creativity in schools has been recognized to some 
extent by previous UK governments. For example, in 1998 the National Advisory 
Committee on Creative and Cultural Education (NACCCE) was set up by the then 
Secretary of State for Education and Employment, David Blunkett MP and the 
Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport,  Chris Smith MP with the view to: 
“make recommendations to the Secretaries of State on the creative and cultural 
development of young people through formal and informal education: to take stock of 
current provision and to make proposals for principles, policies and practice” 
(NACCCE, 1998,  p. 1).  
The NACCCE endorsed a “democratic definition” of creativity (p. 29) and 
suggested that all pupils should be given the opportunity to develop their creative skills. 
The NACCCE recommended the development of partnerships between schools and 
external organisations (such as museums, sporting organisations and performing arts 
organisations) in order to foster pupils’ creativity and build links with the community. 
The NACCCE report also emphasised the role of teachers in fostering creativity in 
pupils as the following quote demonstrates: 
 
Creativity can be ‘taught’. Teachers can be creative in their own teaching; they 
can also promote the creative abilities of their pupils. The roles of teachers are to 
recognise young people’s creative capacities; and to provide the particular 
conditions in which they can be realised (NACCCE, 1998, p. 11). 
 
In response to the NACCCE report, the Department for Education and Skills 
(DfES) created the Creativity And Cultural Enrichment working group (CACE) in 
2001, which was succeeded by the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA) 
initiative “Creativity: Find it, Promote it” designed to increase schools’ capacity to 
support creativity in educational settings (QCA, 2004). In addition, Creative 
Partnerships were set up nationally in 2002 to support projects between schools in 
disadvantaged areas and creative organisations. An independent review entitled: 
“Nurturing creativity in young people” (Roberts, 2006) reflected the previous 
Government's commitment to creativity and set out proposals to inform future policy. 
However, to my knowledge, no recent initiatives have been rolled out under current       20 
 
coalition Government, and funding for the Creative Partnerships programme was 
withdrawn in 2011.  
The current Early Years Foundation Stage curriculum (EYFS; DCSF, 2008) 
emphasises the need for youngsters to learn through play, and indeed one of the 
curriculum strands is entitled “Creative Development” which suggests creativity is a 
valued part of pupils’ early educational experience. However, it seems plausible to 
suggest that creativity is less likely to be supported as the pupil moves through the 
school system, given the pressures teachers face to prepare pupils for high status public 
examinations.  
It seems then, that the importance of fostering creativity in young people has 
been recognised to some extent at the governmental level. However, it is also important 
to explore the views of those who are able to directly influence creativity in young 
people, namely teachers.  
There is some evidence to suggest that teachers’ views on creative pupils are 
complex. For example, Kampylis, Berki, and Saariluoma (2009) presented Greek 
primary school teachers and teachers in-training with a self-report questionnaire in order 
to explore their implicit theories of creativity.  The majority of participants endorsed the 
view that creativity can be developed in all individuals, but only half of participants 
expressed the view that creativity can be taught.  The authors concluded that 
participants held “inconsistent implicit theories about creativity” (p. 25), which may 
inhibit their ability to foster creativity in the classroom. Furthermore, the majority of 
teachers and teachers in training indicated that they did not feel well qualified to support 
pupils’ creativity in the classroom. However, given that this study was based on a 
sample of Greek teachers and teachers in training, such findings may not be 
generalizable to teachers in the UK.  
In addition, there is evidence to suggest that some teachers perceive creative 
students as non-conformists (Chan & Chan, 1999) and potential trouble makers (Scott, 
1999). Indeed, Sternberg (1985) found that teachers associated creative personalities 
with negative traits such as impulsivity and risk taking which, in the words of Westby 
and Dawson (1995), may impact on the teachers’ “goals for maintaining order and 
attending to multiple children” (p. 2). Indeed, Kennedy (2005) observed that teachers 
often dismiss pupils’ unexpected responses in classroom discussion, and note that while 
this may be legitimate in some circumstances, such practice could potentially limit 
opportunities for creative development.       21 
 
 Furthermore, Beghetto (2007) asked teachers in training to rate how useful they felt 
relevant or unique contributions were during class discussion. It was found that teachers 
in training generally valued relevance in the classroom over novel thought. Qualitative 
analysis of participants’ responses revealed that novel contributions tended to be 
perceived as “potentially disruptive” or distracting (p. 7), although some participants 
suggested that novel contributions were  “worth pursuing” and a welcome indicator of 
pupil participation in the lesson (p. 6).  
  The above research indicates that whilst teachers recognise the importance of 
supporting pupils’ creativity in school on one level, their perceptions of creative 
students can be somewhat negative. Such a conflicted view of creativity suggests that 
there is a need to further explore theoretical models of creativity with school staff in 
order to raise their awareness of creativity as a construct. The following section will 
therefore focus on the key theoretical perspectives on creativity, drawing on relevant 
evidence in the literature. 
 
1.2 Models of creativity 
Consistent with a number of authors in the literature (e.g. Fishkin & Johnson, 
1998; Runco, 2004), this paper distinguishes between four approaches to the study of 
creativity: the “creative person”, “creative product”, “creative press” and “creative 
process” (Rhodes, 1987, p. 218). This literature review therefore will briefly outline 
research  surrounding  the creative person, product and press before focusing in more 
detail on theories of creative processing, in particular looking at the role of associative 
and attentional processes in creativity. 
 
   1.2.1 Creative person. Some authors conceptualise creativity in terms of the 
creative personality. Indeed, the common stereotype of the creative individual as a 
socially awkward genius led Galang (2010) to coin the phrase “pro-social psychopaths”, 
which captures the paradoxical nature of the creative personality. Typically, authors 
adopting this trait approach employ correlational designs in order to unpick the creative 
personality. In particular, two influential models of personality are commonly referred 
to in the literature: McCrae and Costa’s (1987) Big Five model of personality 
(incorporating openness to experience; agreeableness; conscientiousness; extraversion 
and neuroticism) and Eysenck’s (1967) Gigantic Three model of personality 
(incorporating extroversion; neuroticism and psychoticism).        22 
 
In a recent review, Batey and Furnham (2006) claim that there is a lack of 
consensus in the literature regarding the creative personality. They attribute this to 
variations in the use of measures of creativity and personality. The authors tentatively 
conclude that when creativity is indexed by scores on tests of divergent thinking, 
extroversion appears to be correlated positively with creativity. They argue that the 
research findings implicating a relationship between creativity and psychoticism are 
more equivocal. In addition, the authors attempt to account for findings implicating the 
role of openness to experience and creativity by hypothesising that openness: 
 
Consists of two subfactors: one factor representing an attitudinal openness to 
new experiences and the second factor being, rather than a choice, an inability to 
inhibit  irrelevant  information,  a  perceptual  openness.  This  suggests  that  to  a 
certain extent, open people are more open to new ideas because they cannot 
effectively filter out irrelevant information (Batey & Furnham, 2006, p. 399).   
 
Batey and Furnham (2006) emphasise that creativity in different fields such as 
the arts or science may require different combinations of personality traits. It seems 
therefore, that creativity can be associated with a constellation of broad personality 
traits.   
In a similar vein, there has been some debate within the literature concerning the 
role of intelligence in creativity. Some authors have found a modest relationship 
between intelligence as measured by Intelligence Quotient (IQ) tests and creativity. For 
example, in their review of the literature, Batey and Furnham (2006) concluded that 
intelligence and creativity are correlated in the range of r = .20 to .40. Similarly, a 
recent study by Batey, Chamorro-Premuzic and Furnham (2009) found that intelligence 
accounted for 17% of the variance in participants’ divergent thinking fluency scores. 
However, it must be acknowledged that their measure of creativity only took into 
account the number of ideas produced rather than number of original and useful ideas 
produces so it is questionable whether these results apply to creativity per se.   
It has been suggested that intelligence and creativity are correlated up to a point, 
but that this relationship disappears in individuals who are highly intelligent (Barron, 
1969).  Researchers often specify that an IQ of 120 marks this threshold (e.g. Preckel, 
Holing & Weise, 2006). However, there is inconsistent evidence for this notion within 
the literature. It has been suggested that methodological differences may account for       23 
 
this lack of consensus, as researchers utilise different measures of academic ability and 
creativity (Preckel, et al. 2006).  Preckel et al. (2006) found that correlations between 
divergent thinking scores and intelligence were of a comparable magnitude across a 
sample of pupils aged between 12 and 16 ranging in ability (including those deemed 
intellectually ‘gifted’), which is inconsistent with predictions from the threshold 
hypothesis.  Furthermore, a recent meta-analysis of the literature found that the mean 
correlation coefficient between creativity and intelligence was small (r=.17; Kim, 2005) 
and that when the potential moderating role of a threshold of IQ was explored, this 
variable “could not explain variance in the studies’ correlation coefficients” (p.63). Kim 
(2005) also suggests that “when creativity tests are administered in a game like testing 
context, the creativity test scores have smaller relationships with IQ test scores” (p. 65) 
which implicates the influence of situational factors on pupils’ performance.  We will 
return to this idea later in the paper. 
 This paper will now outline another approach to the study of creativity, where 
the focus is not on the creative person, rather the product of their creative thinking.  
 
1.2.2 Creative product. Historically, the ability to produce a creative solution to 
a problem was considered to be the sole preserve of the ‘genius’. Retrospective accounts 
of creative achievements by figures such as Einstein, Darwin and Beethoven reinforced 
the notion of “Big-C (eminent) creativity” (Beghetto & Kaufman, 2007, p. 73). 
However, contemporary theorists have suggested that this is a misconception and 
emphasised the notion of everyday or “little-c creativity” (Beghetto & Kaufman, 2007, 
p.73). Kaufman and Beghetto (2009) further refined this distinction in their “four C 
model of creativity”. They assert that in addition to ‘Big-C’ and ‘little-c’ creativity, 
there exists two further categories of creativity: ‘mini-c’ and ‘pro- c’ creativity. Mini-c 
creativity refers to “novel and personally meaningful interpretation of experiences, 
actions, and events” and is conceptualised as part of the learning process (Beghetto & 
Kaufmann, 2007, p.73). It is argued that pro-c creativity encompasses the achievements 
of individuals who display creativity in their professions but have not yet reached 
eminent status (Kaufmann & Beghettto, 2009). Kaufmann and Beghetto (2009) provide 
the following vignette to illustrate the differences between these categories: 
 
       24 
 
Consider Marcus, a (fictional) writer who has published four novels that have been 
reasonably well-received; perhaps one novel was given a regional prize. If we stick to 
little-c versus Big-C distinctions, where do we place Marcus? Sticking Marcus into the 
little-c category diminishes everything he has earned. Yet placing Marcus in the Big-C 
category is premature. Whether Marcus’s work will be remembered, read, and enjoyed 
years  after  his  death  is  beyond  his  control.  Marcus  has  attained  a  level  of  creative 
acumen  in  a  professional  field,  and  should  be  compared  with  similar-stage  writers. 
Comparing him with Hemingway, Poe, and Twain does him no favors; neither does 
placing him with those who have yet to prove themselves. The Pro-c category offers 
accomplished creative individuals their own category (p.5). 
 
This conceptualisation of creativity offers researchers a means of categorising 
the products of creative behaviour, and may help teachers recognise the ‘little c’ and 
‘mini-c’  forms  of  creativity  that  may  be  occurring  in  their  classroom;  however  its 
usefulness as an explanatory framework is limited. 
 
1.2.3 Creative press. Researchers who emphasise the pressures exerted by 
situational factors on creativity can be considered to work within the sphere of creative 
press. According to Rhodes (1987) the term “press” refers to “the relationship between 
human beings and their environment” (p. 220). In adopting a more interactionist point 
of view, such theorists move away from individualistic accounts of creativity. Amabile 
(1996) identified the following positive “social environmental influences on creativity”:  
autonomy; sufficient resources; recognition and co-worker openness (p. 120).  Potential 
inhibitors of creativity have been suggested to be surveillance, competition, and rigid 
organisational procedures (Amabile, 1996). Indeed, Witt and Beorkrem (1989) found a 
positive relationship between “climates of creative productivity” (p. 33) in the 
workplace and ratings of organisational effectiveness amongst employees in a military 
organisation.  Furthermore, the role of the school environment on creativity has been 
demonstrated in a recent study by Besancon and Lubart (2008). The authors found that 
pupils aged between 7 and 12 years old schooled in alternative learning environments  
(such as Montessori
1 schools) performed better on tests of divergent thinking and 
                                                           
1 Montessori schools encourage pupils to learn through a process of self-initiated discovery. Specially 
designed educational materials are used in these settings to support learning, and pupils are given more       25 
 
creative writing or drawing tasks, than pupils schooled in more traditional learning 
environments. Such a perspective suggests the potentially important role of the 
environment in fostering creativity. 
 
1.2.4 Creative process. Other researchers in the literature have focused on 
creative processing. Lubart (2001) defines the creative process as: “the sequence of 
thoughts and actions that leads to novel, adaptive production” (p. 295). Historically, the 
creative process has been conceptualised as a four stage process: (a) preparation, (b) 
incubation, (c) illumination, and (d) verification (Wallas, 1926). It is hypothesised that 
creativity requires a period of preparation, where the problem dimensions are explored 
fully, which is then is followed by incubation; a period of time spent not thinking about 
the problem directly. Unconscious processing of the problem is hypothesised to lead to 
a moment of insight or illumination and subsequent verification of the idea follows in 
order to ensure the solution is fit for purpose (Wallas, 1926). This places creativity as a 
form of unconscious processing (Weisberg, 2006). The notion of “illumination” 
resonates with the view of Gestalt theorists, who conceptualise creativity in terms of 
“leaps of insight” during unconscious processing (Weisberg, 2006, p. 94). 
 Although Wallas’ (1926) theory was based on introspective accounts of the 
creative process, there has been some attempt to empirically validate this theory. For 
example, artists have been asked to compose a picture whilst verbalising their thoughts 
aloud (Patrick, 1937). Everything participants said during the task and the order in 
which they assembled their pictures, was recorded by the researcher. Patrick (1937) 
divided the sessions into quarters and found that for the first quarter, participants 
demonstrated numerous shifts in thought which was taken as evidence of preparation. It 
was also found that over two thirds of shapes drawn were drawn for the first time in the 
second and third quarter, which was taken as evidence of illumination. In the last 
quarter, Patrick (1937) claimed that participants made numerous revisions to their work, 
which was deemed evidence of verification. In the words of Patrick (1937): “the 
presence of incubation was shown if an idea occurred early in the report, recurred one or 
more times, the subject meanwhile talking of other things and at last appeared as the 
chief topic of the picture” ( p. 43). Participants were also interviewed about their normal 
                                                                                                                                                                          
freedom to follow their interests than in traditional pedagogical approaches (see Lillard, 2007 for further 
details).       26 
 
working practice, and participants’ responses appear consistent with Wallas’ (1926) 
conceptualisation of creativity. However, upon closer inspection of the interview 
questions provided in Patrick’s (1937) paper, some appear to be leading questions. For 
example participants were asked: “When you get ready to draw a picture do you 
incubate it a while first?” and “do you revise your picture much?” which may have 
influenced participants’ responses (p.40). Indeed,  Lubart (2001) notes that Patrick’s 
(1937) study may be flawed by confirmative bias and questions the face validity of 
Patrick’s (1937) operalisation of the four stages as outlined above. Furthermore, Lubart 
(2001) claims that Wallas’ (1926) model is too vague to be useful, and that there is a 
need to specify sub-processes involved in creativity. To this end, this paper will now 
focus on two sub-processes which have been implicated in the creative process: 
associative processes and attentional processes. 
 
1.2.4.1 Associative processes in creativity. Mednick (1962) defined creativity as 
“the forming of associative elements into new combinations which either meet specified 
requirements or are in some way useful” (p. 221).  According to Mednick (1962), the 
more “remote” two associations are, the more likely the solution will be creative 
(p.221). Mednick’s (1962) associative theory assumes that there are three ways of 
forming remote associations, which may lead to a creative outcome. Firstly, it is 
suggested that ideas which are presented contiguously in the environment may lead to 
the “serendipitous” association of remote ideas (p. 221). Secondly, it is possible that an 
individual may notice the contiguity between two remote ideas by noticing points of 
“similarity” in disparate associations (p. 222). For example, Mednick (1962) described 
how certain aspects of creative writing (such as alliteration and use of rhyme) appear to 
exploit points of similarity in ideas. Thirdly, it is suggested that two remote associations 
may be linked by noticing contiguity between “mediating” factors common to both 
elements (p. 222).  
  Mednick (1962) proposed that when an individual is asked to consider the 
word “table” for example, this activates a number of associations.  Conventional or 
common associations such as “chair” are hypothesised to occur first in the associative 
chain and more original ideas are considered later. An individual’s pattern of associative 
responses is termed their “associative hierarchy” (p. 222). Individuals with a steep 
associative hierarchy tend to emit a number of conventional responses (e.g. chair, cloth) 
which are strongly associated with stimulus (i.e. table) but fewer remote associations. In       27 
 
individuals with a flatter associative hierarchy, conventional responses are not thought 
to be “overly dominant” (p. 223). As a result, it is hypothesised that individuals with a 
flatter associative hierarchy will be better able to access remote associations than those 
with a steep associative hierarchy. Mednick’s (1962) model predicts that creative 
thinkers are more likely to consider creative solutions to a problem because they have 
flatter associative hierarchies than non-creative individuals. Mednick proposed that 
creative people are better at finding remote associations and have more associations 
pertinent to the problem than non-creative people. Mednick (1962) developed the 
Remote Associates Test (RAT) of creativity on the basis of his theory. In this task, 
participants are presented with two seemingly remote ideas (e.g. mines and lick) and are 
asked to find the associative link between them (i.e. salt). Individuals with a flatter 
associative hierarchy are hypothesised to perform better on this task, as they are better 
able to access remote associations. 
An early study by Mendelsohn (1976) used the RAT in order to explore 
associative processes in creativity. Participants were required to solve 30 anagrams 
organised into three categories (i.e. food, animals and miscellaneous). Participants in the 
informed condition were told that 10 of the anagrams fell into each category; in the 
uninformed condition participants were not told that the anagrams were categorical in 
nature. Those who scored highly on the RAT were found to make better use of 
contextual clues in the informed anagram condition than low scorers on the RAT, 
although this effect only held true for males. Mendelsohn (1976) argued that this 
indicates attentional processes are important in RAT performance, a point which we 
will return to later in the paper. 
More recently, Rossman and Finke (2010) explored the relationship between 
associational information processing and creativity in a sample of German 
undergraduates. The authors used a number of measures to index creativity including 
the Alternative Uses Test (AUT; also referred to as the Unusual Uses Task; UUT) 
where participants are asked to think of as many uses as they can for an everyday object 
and subtests from the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking (TTCT; Torrance, 1966, 
2006), where participants are required to extend incomplete line drawings in original 
ways. In addition, participants were presented with a modified version of the word pair 
list task. For the word pair list task, participants were presented with two words and 
asked to come up with a third word that could serve as a “connective associative link” 
(p. 893) between the two previously presented items. In this regard, the word pair task       28 
 
could be seen as an analogous task to the RAT. Participants were also asked to judge the 
associative distance between word pairs on a 6-point rating scale (ranging from 
“strongly related” to “without any relation”). The authors found “a weak but significant 
correlation between the rated associative distance between the presented problem words 
and psychometrically determined creativity” and that “more original individuals 
estimate the associative distance between the unrelated word pairs as being lower than 
less original individuals do” (p. 895). The authors suggest that creative individuals 
benefit from a more “flexible associative network” than non-creative individuals (p. 
895), in line with Mednick's (1962) predictions. The authors also found evidence of a 
link between participants’ self-reported creative hobbies (such as painting, drawing and 
poetry) and associative information processing, which provides further support for the 
role of associative processing in creativity. 
In addition, Eysenck (1995) hypothesised that creative associations are more 
likely to be formed in individuals who have reduced levels of inhibitory control. Indeed 
it seems plausible to suggest that individuals may be more successful in linking remote 
associations if they have reduced inhibition, as unusual “concepts and ideas are less 
likely to be inhibited” (White & Shah, 2006, p. 1123). Indeed, Carson, Higgins and 
Peterson (2003) found that creative undergraduates were seven times more likely to 
demonstrate deficits in latent inhibition than non-creative undergraduates. The authors 
speculate that creative individuals may be less able to “screen out” seemingly irrelevant 
stimuli (p.499) leading to more original responses. It is important to note however, that 
the participants in the studies included in the meta-analysis were young adults with high 
IQs and it is not clear how generalizable this may be to other populations. 
The research outlined above indicates that associative processing may be 
important in creativity and in particular, the association between disparate concepts may 
give rise to creative solutions. There is also some preliminary evidence in the literature 
that reduced inhibition may be associated with creative processing. 
 
1.2.4.2 Attentional processes in creativity. Martindale (1995) suggests that 
Mednick’s (1962) associative model can be understood cognitively in terms of 
conceptual attention, i.e. the ability to attend to a range of concepts at the same time. 
Individuals who have a steep associative hierarchy are hypothesised to have a narrow 
focus of conceptual attention, which limits their ability to link remote associates. By 
contrast, individuals who have flatter associative hierarchies are hypothesised to have a       29 
 
broader range of conceptual attention (so called “defocused attention”) and hence 
greater ability to form remote associates (Martindale, 1995, p. 245).   According to 
Vartanian, Martindale and Kwiatkowski (2007) “defocused attention may be caused by 
reduced cognitive inhibition, where inhibition is understood as a mechanism that can 
restrict the flow of information into the focus of attention” (p. 1471). 
In Friedman, Fishbach, Forster and Werth’s (2003) study, participants were 
asked to complete a visual search task which encouraged them to adopt a narrow 
perceptual scope of attention or a broad perceptual scope of attention. They were then 
asked to complete creativity tasks (i.e. a picture caption task and the AUT). In line with 
their attentional priming hypothesis, participants who were primed to adopt a broad 
scope of perceptual attention generated more original responses to the creative task than 
those who were primed to adopt a narrow scope of perceptual attention. 
 In addition, other evidence in the literature indicates that individuals with a 
wide “breadth of attention” (Kasof, 1997, p. 303) perform better on creative tasks than 
those with a narrower scope of attention. Participants in Kasof’s (1997) study completed 
a self-report measure of breadth of attention, in order to assess their ability to filter out 
extraneous stimuli such as noise and the feel of clothing on their skin. They were asked 
to write a poem around stimulus words ‘joy’ and ‘butterfly’ in the presence of noise 
stimuli (intelligible vs. unintelligible; predictable vs. unpredictable). Poems were 
subjectively rated for creativity and the language used by participants was coded for 
originality. The authors found that self-reported trait breadth of attention was positively 
correlated with creative performance on the poetry task. In addition, the authors 
reported that “exposure to attention narrowing environmental stimulation in the form of 
noise, hindered creative performance on the poetry task” (p. 310) and that this effect 
was greater in people who reported having a greater breadth of attention than those who 
had a narrow breadth of attention. Similarly, Memmert (2009) explored the role of  
“inattentional blindness” (p. 302) on creative responses and found that children who 
showed less inattentional blindness (i.e. those who noticed unexpected stimuli on a 
computer task) produced significantly more original ideas on a measure of divergent 
thinking.  
Such research indicates that defocused attention is important in creativity. 
Indeed, in Ansburg and Hill’s (2003) study, participants were required to memorise a 
list of 25 words, whilst ignoring another 25 words playing in the background. 
Participants were then asked to solve 30 written anagrams and to recall the list of words       30 
 
previously presented. Ten of the words participants were asked to memorise were 
solutions to the anagrams and therefore became focal cues. A further 10 words which 
were played in the background were solutions to anagrams and therefore acted as 
peripheral cues. Participants were asked to complete the RAT and deductive reasoning 
problems in order to assess their creativity and analytical thinking respectively. Multiple 
regression analysis revealed that creative thinking predicted the ability to “diffuse 
attention and take advantage of peripherally presented cues” (p. 1146), whereas analytic 
thinking did not.  
  However, it has been suggested that whilst defocused attention may be 
important in the initial stages of creative thinking, individuals must be able to engage in 
focused attention in order to refine their creative solution to a problem and ensure its 
appropriateness (Ansburg & Hill, 2003). In the words of Vartanian et al. (2007) 
defocused attention may be a “variable state, rather than a stable trait” (p. 1471). 
Support for this notion has been demonstrated by Vartanian et al. (2007). The authors 
combined participants’ scores on the RAT, AUT and Creative Personality Scale to give 
an index of “creative potential” (p. 1473) and found a positive correlation between 
creative potential and reaction times on tests which had an element of interference or 
ambiguity (e.g. Negative Priming Task and  the Global Precedence task). The authors 
also found a negative correlation between creative potential and reaction times on tests 
that did not have an element of interference or ambiguity (e.g. Hick Task and the 
Concept Verification Task). The authors suggested that tasks which are more 
ambiguous require more defocused attention (and hence longer response latencies), than 
tasks which are less ambiguous (Vartanian et al. 2007).   
In short, the literature discussed above indicates that creative processing may 
involve defocused attention and reduced inhibitory control. Such constructs also feature 
in the literature surrounding Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). The 
following sections will therefore briefly outline the nature of ADHD before attempting 
to draw some parallels between aspects of creativity and ADHD. 
 
1.3 What is Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD)? 
According to the NICE (2008) guidelines “ADHD is a heterogeneous behavioural 
syndrome characterised by the core symptoms of hyperactivity, impulsivity and 
inattention” (p. 4). ADHD is a relatively common condition, which affects 
approximately 3 to 7% of school age pupils (APA, 2000). A recent meta-analysis of       31 
 
studies reporting a point prevalence of ADHD in individuals under the age of 18, found 
that the world-wide pooled prevalence of ADHD was 5.29% (Polanzyck, de Lima, 
Horta, Biederman, Rohde, 2007). The DSM-IV-TR distinguishes between 3 subtypes of 
ADHD: combined type (if both inattention and hyperactivity are present); 
predominantly inattentive type, and predominantly hyperactive/impulsive type.  As 
alluded to at the start of the paper, researchers differ in their ontological stance towards 
ADHD. The DSM-IV-TR criteria encourage a categorical definition of ADHD, 
although it is possible to conceptualise ADHD as lying at the extreme end of a 
continuum of dimensions. Support for the dimensional view of ADHD has been 
provided by genetic twin based studies exploring the aetiology of ADHD. ADHD is 
highly heritable although crucially, when heritability estimates of monozygotic and 
dizygotic twins are explored across different cut-offs in symptom severity, heritability 
estimate do not vary as a function of symptom severity (Levy, Hay, McStephen, Wood 
& Walderman, 1997) thus lending support to the dimensional view of ADHD.   
The DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) criteria stipulate that in order to qualify for a 
diagnosis of ADHD, there must be evidence that the behavioural symptoms are 
pervasive, that is, occurring in at least two different settings. Individuals must also 
experience a degree of psychological, social or educational impairment as a result of 
their symptoms. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that ADHD is associated with a 
range of long term negative outcomes such as academic underachievement (Ek, 
Westerlund, Holmberg & Fernell, 2011; Frazier, Youngstrom, Glutting & Watkins, 
2007), social functioning difficulties (Rich, Loo, Yang, Dang & Smalley, 2009) and 
criminal delinquency (Pratt, Cullen, Blevins, Daigle, & Unnever, 2002).  
In addition, the role of gender on ADHD symptom severity and prevalence has 
been explored in the literature. It has been estimated that ADHD symptoms are between 
2 and 9 times more prevalent in males than females (APA, 2000). In addition, a large 
scale study  found a significant main effect for gender on ADHD symptom severity, 
with ADHD girls being rated as “less symptomatic” than boys with ADHD by both 
parents and teachers  (Newcorn et al, 2001, p.144), which may account for gender 
differences in diagnoses. Similarly, a meta-analysis by Gaub and Carlson (1997) found 
that girls with ADHD displayed lower levels of hyperactivity and externalising 
behaviour than boys with ADHD.  Gaub and Carlson (1997) highlighted the fact that 
proportionally fewer girls are referred to ADHD clinics than boys and hypothesised that 
reduced rates of disruptive behaviour in girls with ADHD symptomology compared to       32 
 
boys may account for this finding.   The authors also emphasised the potentially 
confounding variable of referral source bias on gender differences in symptom severity. 
It was noted that non-referred populations of girls with ADHD symptomology showed 
“less impairment than boys with ADHD on inattention, internalizing behavior, peer 
aggression, and peer disliking” (Gaub & Carlson, 1997,  p. 1041).  By contrast, clinic 
referred boys and girls with ADHD symptomology were found to be similarly impaired 
on these measures (Gaub & Carlson, 1997, p. 1041).  
  It seems that ADHD symptomology is associated with a range of negative 
outcomes in the literature. However, in line with a positive psychology perspective 
(Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000), the current paper seeks to explore whether 
aspects of ADHD symptomology can be reframed in terms of potential strength. Indeed, 
given the evidence outlined earlier in this paper implicating the role of defocused 
attention and reduced inhibitory control in creativity, it is possible that ADHD 
symptoms may confer a creative benefit. The following sections therefore seek to 
explore the evidence base implicating a relationship between ADHD symptomology 
and creativity. 
 
1.4 Is there any evidence of increased creativity in ADHD?  
Within the literature, only a few papers have directly explored the relationship 
between creativity and ADHD (Abraham, Windermann, Siefen, Daum & Gunturkun, 
2006). Indeed, the majority of the research appears to be theoretical speculation rather 
than empirical evidence (Healey & Rucklidge, 2008). For example, Cramond’s (1994) 
notion of “overlapping syndromes” (p. 196) proposes that there is an overlap in 
behavioural indicators of creativity and ADHD. In defence of such an assertion, 
Cramond (1994) indicated that characteristics such as risk taking, emotionality, 
sensation seeking, impulsivity and day dreaming have been used to describe both 
creative and ADHD type personalities in the literature. However, the evidence cited in 
Cramond’s (1994) paper suggests a reliance on primarily subjective, descriptive 
accounts of creative personalities, rather than objective empirical evidence. Similarly, 
Leroux and Levitt-Pervill (2000), assert that gifted ADHD individuals are often 
creative, yet they provide no evidence to support their claim. 
Within the literature base, there has been some attempt to empirically investigate 
the relationship between ADHD and creativity. Shaw and Brown (1990) found that 
pupils with elevated levels of  ADHD symptomology displayed evidence of greater       33 
 
figural creativity than controls, as indexed by a subtest from the figural TTCT (a 
measure of divergent thinking). By contrast, no significant group differences were 
found on a verbal subtest of the TTCT. The authors acknowledge that a potential 
limiting factor in this study could have been the fact that their ADHD group was 
selected by teachers and school psychologists without the use of a standardised rating 
scale. In addition, they suggest that their teacher selected control group may have been 
biased towards the selection of “highly diligent” (p. 52) pupils, thus limiting the 
generalizability of their findings.  The authors attempted to address some of these 
methodological limitations in a subsequent study (Shaw & Brown, 1991) and found that 
their initial findings were robust. 
 In a recent attempt to unpick the relationship between ADHD and creativity, 
Healey and Rucklige (2006) explored the prevalence of ADHD symptomology in a 
sample of creative children between 10 and 12 years old (who scored above the 90th 
percentile on the TTCT). Their results indicated that 40% creative children displayed 
elevated levels of ADHD symptomology, although none met the full diagnostic criteria 
for ADHD. The authors observed that: 
 
Given the cut-off used to identify children with ADHD symptomatology was 1.5 
SD above the mean, one would expect approximately 9% of children within the 
general population to display clinically elevated levels of ADHD 
symptomatology. That this current study found a rate over four times expected 
suggests that ADHD symptomatology in a creative population is a relatively 
common occurrence (p. 433) 
 
 However, some authors have found no group differences between children with 
ADHD and controls on tests of creativity such as the figural TTCT and insight problems 
(Healey & Rucklidge, 2008).   
It is important to note at this point that there is some evidence to suggest that 
stimulant medications (such as methylphenidate; MPH), which are commonly 
prescribed to help ADHD children sustain attention,  may actually reduce “cognitive 
flexibility” in some ADHD children  (Tannock & Schachar, 1992, p. 1218) therefore 
introducing a potential confound into studies exploring creativity in ADHD. Cognitive 
flexibility has been described in the literature as the ability to “shift freely from one 
concept to another or change a course of action or thought according to the demands of       34 
 
a new situation” (Tannock, Schachar & Logan, 1995, p. 236) and is contrasted with 
“attentional over focusing and perservation” (Tannock & Schachar, 1992, p. 217). 
Tannock and Schachar (1992) found that MPH use temporarily increased the number of 
perseverative errors made by participants with ADHD, on the Wisconsin Card Sorting 
task, indicating a reduced ability to shift mental set (but see Tannock, Schachar & 
Logan, 1995). It seems plausible to assume that if ADHD medication leads to 
“cognitive overfocusing” (Swartwood, Swartwood & Farrell, 2003, p. 417), 
participants’ performance on divergent thinking tasks would decrease, as these tasks 
require a degree of flexibility of thought. Swartwood et al.’s (2003) cross-sectional 
design explored the effects of MPH on the divergent thinking abilities of pupils with 
ADHD. Pupils were asked to complete a figural test of divergent thinking one hour after 
receiving medication and 12 hours after abstaining from medication. The authors found 
a significant effect of ADHD medication on participants’ ability to elaborate on a 
creative idea, as indexed by a test of divergent thinking. The authors noted that 
“participants in this study provided more symmetrical, less complex embellishments 
while under the influence of MPH, indicating that creative thinking may be subtly 
influenced with stimulant treatment” (p. 419). This suggests that the effect of MPH on 
creativity may be specific to one dimension of creativity, that of elaboration, as other 
aspects of creativity (such as fluency, flexibility and originality) were not significantly 
different between conditions. 
 The above findings indicate that stimulant medication may be a potential 
confound in experimental studies exploring creativity in ADHD. In addition, given that 
stimulant medications are prescribed to pupils as a means of improving attentional 
focus, the fact that some researchers have noted a subsequent decrease in creative 
performance could be taken as further evidence of a putative link between the role of 
breadth of attention and creative performance. 
Theories of creativity that emphasise the role of defocused attention in 
creativity, appear to be intuitively plausible explanations of increased creativity in 
ADHD, given that one of the key difficulties associated with ADHD is inattentiveness. 
However, as Vartanian et al. (2007) note, the ability to shift between defocused attention 
and sustained attention is important in the creative process. Indeed, Abraham et al. 
(2006) explored the performance of young adolescents with ADHD symptomology on a 
recently activated knowledge task and a creative imagery task. The former task required 
participants to produce a novel design for a toy, after being shown exemplars of toys,       35 
 
which had three common elements (i.e. use of electronics, presence of a ball and high 
physical activity). The novelty of participants’ designs was judged on how successful 
participants were in ignoring the “active contexts” of the exemplars (p. 120). For the 
creative imagery task, participants were required to put three objects together in a 
meaningful way to form a novel object that fell into a pre-determined category e.g. 
furniture, tools, toys, weapons or transportation. The authors found that participants 
with ADHD symptomology were better able to generate unique responses on the 
recently activated knowledge task but struggled to generate original and functional 
responses on the creative imagery task when compared to non–clinical controls. This 
suggests that whilst individuals with ADHD symptomology were able to generate 
original solutions, they were unable to refine their solution in order to generate 
functionally appropriate responses, and that this may be the result of their inability to 
shift from defocused to focused attention.  However it should be noted that it is possible 
that the above findings may be contaminated with order effects (such as practice effects 
or fatigue), given that the tasks were not counterbalanced during the study. 
 In a similar vein, White and Shah (2006) compared the performance of adults 
with a diagnosis of ADHD on a measure of divergent thinking (UUT), convergent 
thinking (RAT), and a measure of executive inhibition (semantic Inhibition of Return 
task; IOR) to non-ADHD controls.  The authors hypothesised that a high level of 
inhibition is necessary for solving convergent tasks in order to inhibit “partial solutions” 
(p. 1122) and arrive at the correct, single solution. In contrast, they  hypothesised that  
low levels of inhibition may be beneficial for solving divergent thinking tasks, where it 
is important that low frequency ideas are not inhibited. White and Shah (2006) found 
that “ADHD individuals outperformed non-ADHD individuals on the Unusual Uses 
Task, but performed worse than non-ADHD on the Remote Associates Test and the 
semantic IOR task” (p. 1121). Inhibition was found to mediate the relationship between 
ADHD and performance on the convergent thinking task, which was in line with their 
predictions. However, inhibition was not found to mediate the relationship between 
ADHD and performance on the test of divergent thinking, which was not anticipated. 
The authors speculate that the test of inhibition used in their study, might not be 
sensitive to inhibitory deficits which are involved in divergent thinking skills.  
In short, there appears to be some preliminary evidence in the literature 
indicating a relationship between ADHD symptomology and creativity. This paper will       36 
 
now attempt to account for the evidence reviewed above through reference to 
psychological theories of ADHD. 
 
1.5. Models of ADHD 
 
1.5.1. Evolutionary models of ADHD. Evolutionary theories of ADHD assume 
that ADHD traits confer a selective advantage and hence have been selected for during 
human evolution. In essence, such theories are consistent with a positive psychology 
perspective on the human condition (Seligman & Czsentmihalyi, 2000), as they seek to 
account for ADHD in terms of evolutionary benefit. Evolutionary theories of ADHD 
emphasise the heritability and adaptive significance of ADHD to societies.  For 
example, Hartmann (1999) reframed attention deficit in ADHD as superior vigilance to 
surroundings, and suggested that such a characteristic may have supported the 
development of early human hunter society. Although evolutionary theories are difficult 
to test empirically, there has been some attempt to explore the evolutionary significance 
of ADHD traits. For example, there is some preliminary evidence indicating that long 
dopamine receptor D4 alleles, which are associated with novelty seeking (Epstein et al, 
1996) and ADHD (Faraaone, Doyle, Mick & Biederman, 2001), are more common in 
populations that have a history of migration than more sedentary populations (Chen, 
Burton, Greenberger, & Dmitrieva, 1999). The authors speculate that exploratory 
behaviour associated with the DRD4 long allele was selected for in the evolutionary 
history of migratory populations (Chen et al. 1999). Supporters of the evolutionary 
perspective on ADHD claim that behavioural traits associated with ADHD (such as 
visual scanning, impulsivity and hyperactivity) that confer “response readiness” in 
hostile environments (Jensen et al. 1997, p. 1677), may not be as adaptive in modern 
society, which has been described as the “anachronism” of ADHD (Arcos-Burcos & 
Acosta, 2007, p. 237).   
Furthermore, in a computer simulation of the Changing Food group task, 
Williams and Taylor (2006) demonstrated that unpredictable, risky behaviour by a 
minority confers benefits to the whole group. The authors suggest that whilst risky 
behaviour may confer disadvantages for the individual, the rest of the group can benefit 
from learning from that individual’s mistakes (Williams & Taylor, 2006).  Although 
Williams and Taylor (2006) attempted to falsify their theory by presenting some 
testable predictions for future research, to my knowledge such research has yet to be       37 
 
completed. Furthermore, as the authors recognise, their theory remains speculative, in 
the sense that they “cannot demonstrate that these tasks actually occurred sufficiently 
enough to have affected the course of evolution” (Williams & Taylor, p. 408).  
 
1.5.2 Cognitive deficit models of ADHD. At a different conceptual level, theorists 
have proposed that ADHD is the result of underlying deficits in executive function 
(EF). According to Castellannos, Sonuga-Barke, Milham and Tannock (2006), the term 
EF refers to a range of higher order cognitive processes “that enable flexible, goal-
directed behaviour”; such as inhibition of irrelevant stimuli, task switching and planning 
(p.118). 
 An influential EF deficit theory of ADHD was proposed by Barkley (1997). 
This model asserts that a central deficit in a domain of EF known as behavioural 
inhibition underlies ADHD symptomology.  Behavioural inhibition is hypothesised to: 
allow inhibition of prepotent responses; stop an on-going response and engage in on-
line interference control. It is argued that deficits in behavioural inhibition cause 
secondary deficits in four other areas of EF: “a) working memory; b) self-regulation of 
affect, motivation and arousal; c) internalisation of speech and d) reconstitution 
(behavioural analysis and synthesis)” (Barkley, 1997, p. 65). Such secondary deficits in 
EF in turn, are hypothesised to impact on an individual’s ability to engage in “motor 
control, fluency and syntax” (p.73), which permit effective goal directed movement. 
Although this model is portrayed as an account of hyperactivity, that is, reduced motor 
control, Barkley (1997) claims that this model can also describe deficits in attention in 
ADHD.  Barkley (1997) suggests that inattentiveness “represents an impairment in goal 
or task directed persistence arising from poor inhibition and the toll it takes on self-
regulation” (p. 84). Consequently, this model conceptualises attention deficit as a 
“secondary” symptom in ADHD, resulting from “poor behavioural inhibition and 
interference control” (p. 84). 
This influential model of ADHD has received some support from the literature. 
For example, Makris et al. (2007) utilised magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) 
technology in order to explore the cortical thickness of adults with ADHD 
symptomology. The authors found evidence of cortical thinning in “networks that 
subserve attention and EF” (p. 1364). There is also evidence to suggest that individuals 
with ADHD symptomology perform poorly on tasks measuring behavioural inhibition. 
Barkley, Grodzinsky and DuPaul’s (1992) review of the literature indicated that of the       38 
 
13 studies reviewed that employed the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task as a measure of 
behavioural inhibition, 8 studies found ADHD populations to be significantly more 
impaired than non-ADHD populations. However, Sergeant, Geurts and Oosterlan 
(2002) conclude that the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task may lack face validity as a test of 
behavioural inhibition as it is variously used in the literature as a measure of “set 
shifting and in others a measure of conceptual problem solving ability, use of feedback, 
the ability to modify incorrect strategies, flexibility, and inhibition of pre-potent but 
incorrect responses” (p. 22). 
   Similarly, there are conflicting reports in the literature about inhibition deficits 
in ADHD when the Stroop task is used to index inhibition. For example, Barkley et al. 
(1992) concluded that five of the six studies reviewed reported that participants high in 
ADHD symptomology performed significantly worse on the Stroop task than non-
ADHD controls.  However, a more recent meta-analysis concluded that no differences 
existed between the performance of individuals diagnosed with ADHD and non-ADHD 
controls on the Stroop task (Schwartz & Verhaeghen, 2008).  
A recent meta-analysis found significant group differences in performance on 
EF tasks between those diagnosed with ADHD and non-ADHD controls in 65% of total 
comparisons. Studies utilising a measure of inhibition known as the Stop Signal Task 
were found to be the most consistent, yielding a weighted mean effect size of .61 across 
studies (Wilcutt, Doyle, Nigg, Faraone & Pennington, 2005).   However, as Wilcutt et 
al. (2005) acknowledged, their interpretation of the literature may be compromised by 
the lack of reported reliability statistics for EF tasks. In addition, Nigg, Willcutt, Doyle 
and Sonuga-Barke (2005) emphasise that the modest effect size noted in the meta-
analysis above indicates that the distribution of scores across individuals high in ADHD 
symptomology overlaps considerably with populations low in ADHD symptomology, 
with respect to performance on EF tasks. They then go on to note that from a sample of 
887 participants across three research centres, at least half of the participants with 
ADHD symptomology showed "normal” performance on EF tasks, which threatens the 
validity of Barkley’s (1997) single deficit theory.  
It seems therefore, that whilst EF deficits may be associated with ADHD 
symptomology in some individuals, it does not seem likely that “EF deficits are the 
single necessary and sufficient cause of ADHD in all individuals with the disorder. 
Instead, EF difficulties appear to be one of several important weaknesses that comprise 
the overall neuropsychologic etiology of ADHD” (Wilcutt et al. 2005, p. 1342). This       39 
 
paper will now discuss the dual pathway model of ADHD, which acknowledges the 
potential role of inhibition deficits in ADHD, as well as accounting for evidence 
indicating that individuals with ADHD may experience deficits in another area known 
as ‘delay aversion’. 
 
1.5.3 Dual pathway model-the role of delay aversion in ADHD. There is evidence in 
the literature that individuals with ADHD symptomology prefer immediate over 
delayed rewards (Luman, Oosterlan & Sergeant, 2005). There is evidence to suggest 
that this represents a motivation to avoid delay rather than an impulsive desire for 
immediate rewards or reward maximisation (Sonuga-Barke, Taylor, Sembi & Smith, 
1992). Sonuga-Barke et al (1992) found that individuals with ADHD were more likely 
to prefer immediate rewards where doing so reduced the overall trial length (i.e. under 
experimental conditions which reduced the amount of delay they had to experience). 
The authors hypothesised that in situations where escape from delay is not possible, 
individuals who are delay averse may resort to hyperactive or inattentive behaviour in 
an attempt to reduce their perceived experience of delay (Sonuga–Barke et al. 1992).  It 
follows then, that individuals who are delay averse may be better able to tolerate delay 
when presented with extra non-temporal stimulation. This notion has received some 
empirical support. For example, Antrop, Roeyers, Van Oost and Buysse (2000) found 
that when pupils were asked to wait in a room for 15 minutes and their behavioural 
responses monitored, those with a clinical diagnosis of ADHD symptomology showed 
evidence of more hyperactive behaviour than non-ADHD controls in the no-stimulation 
condition, but not in the stimulation condition (where a videotape was played in the 
waiting room). 
  In the dual pathway model of ADHD, delay aversion is described in terms of 
motivation, as it is hypothesised that pupils high in ADHD symptomology are not 
unable to tolerate delay but choose to avoid delay, which they experience as aversive 
(Solanto et al. 2001; Sonuga-Barke, 2002).  Indeed, Sonuga-Barke, De Houwer, De 
Ruiter, Ajzenstzen and Holland’s (2004) use of the dot probe conditioning paradigm, 
revealed that pupils high in ADHD symptomology showed an “attentional bias to cues 
for delay-related events” (p. 280) which supports the idea that such individuals perceive 
delay as a ‘threat’. Sonuga-Barke’s (2002) dual pathway model of ADHD (Figure 1) 
proposes that there are two pathways to ADHD, one mediated by executive function 
deficits (the dysregulation of thought and action pathway; DTAP), the other by delay       40 
 
aversion (the motivational style pathway; MSP). The DTAP stipulates that inhibitory 
control deficit is a primary factor in the model, resulting in behavioural and cognitive 
dyresgulation. Behavioural dysregulation manifests itself in turn as behavioural 
symptoms of ADHD (inattentiveness, impulsivity or hyperactivity) and cognitive 
dysregulation leads to poor task engagement. Behavioural symptoms of ADHD and task 
engagement impact negatively on each other via a feedback loop. By contrast, the MSP 
suggests that individuals who have “altered reward mechanisms” (p. 32) may 
experience difficulty in waiting. This difficulty becomes delay aversion when failures to 
wait are punished by the social environment. Delay aversion is then hypothesised to 
lead to ADHD symptoms, as the individual attempts to reduce their feelings of delay 
either by attending to other stimuli or creating their own stimulation. 
It seems intuitively plausible to suggest that two different pathways may mediate 
the symptoms of ADHD, given the heterogeneity in ADHD symptom presentation 
noted earlier in this paper (Wilcutt et al. 2005). Indeed, Solanto et al. (2001) found that 
participants’ scores on the stop signal task (a measure of inhibition) and  the choice 
delay task (a measure of delay aversion) did not correlate together, but when used 
together, possessed “excellent discriminant validity” to distinguish populations of 
individuals high in ADHD symptomology from those low in ADHD symptomology (p. 
215). In support of the dual pathway model, a dissociation between performance on EF 
tasks and delay aversion tasks has also been found in pre-school children presenting 
with ADHD symptomology (Dalen, Sonuga-Barke, Hall & Remington, 2004).        41 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The dual pathway model of ADHD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The dual pathway model. Solid arrows represent the Dysregulation of Thought 
and Action Pathway (DTAP); dashed arrows represent the Motivational Style Pathway 
(MSP). Both pathways lead to ADHD symptoms. Reproduced with permission from 
Sonuga-Barke, (2002). Psychological heterogeneity in AD/HD- a dual pathway model 
of behaviour and cognition. Behavioural Brain Research, 130, p. 32.  
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1.6 Towards a “creative advantage” hypothesis of ADHD 
 There seems to be some preliminary evidence in the literature indicating that 
theories of ADHD and creativity overlap, particularly in terms of the role of defocused 
attention and inhibition.  There is also some evidence in the literature that individuals 
with ADHD symptomology show better performance on tests of divergent thinking than 
controls. In order to extend the observation in the literature of “overlapping syndromes” 
of creativity and ADHD (Cramond, 1994, p.196), the author proposes the “creative 
advantage” hypothesis of ADHD. 
The creative advantage hypothesis predicts that ADHD symptomology may be 
an asset on certain creativity tasks, specifically, divergent thinking tasks.  As described 
in previous sections of this paper, there is a suggestion in the literature that defocused 
attention is important in creativity, at least in the early stages of the creative process 
(Ansburg & Hill, 2003). Individuals with ADHD symptomology are likely to be more 
inattentive than control populations and it is assumed that such a tendency towards 
defocused attention increases the likelihood of remote associates (i.e. statistically 
infrequent ideas) being activated. Consequently, the probability of unique responses 
increases. In this way, the creative advantage hypothesis emphasises the role of 
inattentiveness on creativity in individuals with ADHD symptomology. No specific 
predictions are made regarding the independent contribution of hyperactivity on 
creativity.  
Given the suggestion in the literature that inhibition deficits are important in 
creativity and ADHD symptom presentation, a secondary prediction of the creative 
advantage hypothesis is that individuals whose ADHD symptoms are a result of 
inhibition deficits will show a creative advantage. In line with White and Shah’s (2006) 
hypothesis, it is assumed that reduced inhibitory control may be beneficial in divergent 
thinking tasks as original ideas would be less likely to be inhibited.  
The dual pathway model of ADHD assumes that delay aversion can also lead to 
inattentiveness (defocused attention), and therefore the creative advantage hypothesis 
predicts that delay aversion may also mediate the relationship between ADHD 
symptomology and creativity. Although this notion has not been considered in the 
literature until now, perhaps individuals who are delay averse may be motivated to 
consider multiple solutions to problems, in order to reduce their experience of delay. 
Such an increase in fluency of ideas may increase the likelihood of original responses, 
and hence, creativity.        43 
 
The study outlined in the following empirical paper builds on White and Shah’s 
(2006) between-subjects experimental design. In White and Shah’s (2006) study, adult 
ADHD status was the independent variable (ADHD diagnosis vs. no ADHD diagnosis); 
participants’ scores on two measures of creativity (RAT and UUT) were the dependent 
variables and inhibitory control (as indexed by a semantic IOR task) was a mediator 
variable. Participants in the ADHD group had a clinical diagnosis of ADHD and met 
criteria for inclusion via a self-report measure of ADHD symptoms.  
The study outlined in the following empirical paper adopts a correlational design 
in order to explore the association between ADHD and creativity across a range of 
ADHD symptoms. The present author also seeks to explore creativity in a school-age 
population, using different measures of creativity and inhibition to those presented in 
White and Shah’s (2006) paper. In addition, the present author aims to discriminate 
between two potential mediators (inhibition deficit and delay aversion) of the 
relationship between ADHD symptoms and creativity.  
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Chapter 2: Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder: reframing ‘deficit’ as creative 
strength 
          Abstract 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is a behavioural condition associated 
with inattentiveness, hyperactivity and impulsivity, which is estimated to affect between 
3 and 9% of young people in the UK. Within the literature, ADHD has been associated 
with a range of long term negative outcomes such as academic underachievement and 
criminal delinquency. However, there is some preliminary evidence to suggest that in 
some  circumstances,  possessing  ADHD  symptoms  may  be  beneficial  in  certain 
contexts. This paper seeks to explore the validity of the ‘creative advantage hypothesis’ 
of  ADHD,  which  predicts  that  ADHD  symptoms  will  be  associated  with  increased 
creative  performance.  Furthermore,  based  on  the  notion  that  creativity  may  be 
specifically associated with certain cognitive styles linked to ADHD, it is predicted that 
this  relationship  would  be  mediated  by  differences  in  inhibition.  The  potential 
mediating role of delay aversion is also considered. 
  Sixty six school aged pupils (M=12.4, SD=3.00) whose parents had completed the 
SNAP-IV (Swanson, 1992) rating scale of ADHD symptoms, were presented with the 
Figural  Torrance  Test  of  Creative  Thinking  (Torrance,  1966,  2006),  a  measure  of 
inhibition (Go No Go task; Bitsakou, Psychogiou, Thompson & Sonuga-Barke, 2008) 
and an adapted version of the Maudesley Index of Delay Aversion (MIDA; Kunsti, 
Stevenson & Oosterlaan 2001).  
  Multiple  regression  analysis  revealed  that  levels  of  boys’  ADHD  symptomology 
significantly predicted one aspect of creativity. This relationship was not mediated by 
inhibition or delay aversion. The findings of this study provide some support for the 
creative advantage hypothesis, albeit restricted to boys only. Limitations and practical 
implications of this study are also discussed. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is a behavioural condition 
characterised by inattentiveness, hyperactivity and impulsivity. According to the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000) three 
subtypes of ADHD exist: predominately inattentive; predominately hyperactive and 
combined subtype. The DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) specifies that for a combined type 
diagnosis of ADHD, individuals must display six of the nine specified symptoms of 
inattentiveness and six of the nine specified symptoms of hyperactivity/ impulsivity. If 
an individual does not meet the criteria for a combined diagnosis then it is possible for 
them to receive a diagnosis of predominantly inattentive (ADHD-I) or predominately 
hyperactive (ADHD-H) subtypes.  In order to receive a diagnosis of ADHD, symptoms 
must: be present for at least 6 months; confer significant functional impairment in at 
least two different contexts (e.g. home and school) and not be accounted for by any 
other mental disorder.  
In specifying three subtypes of ADHD, the DSM-IV-TR adopts a categorical 
perspective on ADHD, the implicit assumption being that individuals with ADHD are 
qualitatively different to individuals without ADHD.  However, it is possible to 
conceptualise ADHD in terms of a number of dimensions (such as inattentiveness, 
hyperactivity and impulsivity) that lie on a continuum from mild to severe within the 
normal population. Such a perspective assumes that individuals with ADHD are only 
quantitatively different to those who do not have a diagnosis of ADHD. In support of a 
dimensional view of ADHD, genetic twin based studies have found that ADHD is 
highly heritable, but that crucially, heritability estimates of ADHD are similar across 
subsamples of increasing symptom severity (Levy et al. 1997). This contrasts with 
predictions from a categorical view of ADHD, where significant differences in 
estimates of heritability would be expected as a function of symptom severity. 
Given that ADHD, by definition, specifies a degree of functional impairment, it is 
unsurprising that researchers have identified a range of negative outcomes associated 
with ADHD in the literature. For example, a relatively robust finding in the literature 
implicates the role of ADHD symptomology in academic underachievement (Ek, 
Westerlund, Holmberg & Fernell, 2011; Frazier, Youngstrom, Glutting & Watkins, 
2007; see Loe & Feldman, 2007 for a review). In addition,  a recent meta-analysis 
concluded that “childhood ADHD is associated with a substantially higher risk of a       48 
 
lifetime history of nicotine and illicit substance use, in addition to nicotine dependence, 
alcohol, marijuana, cocaine, and illicit drug abuse/dependence” (Lee, Humphreys, 
Flory, Liu & Glass, 2011, p. 338). Furthermore, longitudinal studies have revealed that 
having a diagnosis of childhood ADHD is a risk factor for psychiatric disorders in early 
adulthood (notably mood disorders, addictive disorders and antisocial disorders) in boys 
(Biederman et al. 2006) and girls (Biederman et al. 2010). There is also evidence to 
suggest that boys with a diagnosis of ADHD and those with co-morbid Oppositional 
Defiant Disorder (ADHD + ODD) possess an elevated risk for delinquency in 
adulthood, when compared to a non-clinical control group (Sibley et al. 2011). The 
authors noted that: “These two groups were more likely to offend earlier, commit a 
greater variety of crimes, and initiate severe delinquency than comparison participants” 
(Sibley et al. 2011, p. 28).  Research suggests that adolescent females with a diagnosis of 
ADHD experience more interpersonal difficulties (such as maternal conflict and fewer 
romantic relationships) than non-ADHD controls (Babinski et al. 2011). However, it is 
important to note that Babinski et al.’s (2011) findings were exploratory and hence the 
authors did not correct for multiple testing; further research is therefore necessary to 
validate these claims. 
 It could be argued that such an emphasis on negative outcomes pathologises 
individuals high in ADHD symptomology and that a paradigm shift in research focus 
towards areas of potential strength may ultimately increase our understanding of 
ADHD. One promising avenue for exploration that has been identified in the literature 
concerns the role of ADHD symptoms in creativity. Although myriad definitions of 
creativity exist in the literature the majority emphasise the need for a creative product to 
be both novel and useful (Plucker et al. 2004).  The following definition of creativity 
captures the general consensus:  “Creativity is the interaction among aptitude, process, 
and environment by which an individual or group produces a perceptible product that is 
both novel and useful as determined within a social context” (Plucker et al. 2004, p. 90).   
In addition, researchers have distinguished between convergent and divergent 
thinking in the creativity literature. Convergent thinking involves “narrowing 
possibilities” in order to find a single, correct solution (Hennesey & Amabile, 2010, 
p.579).  By contrast, divergent thinking involves the consideration of multiple solutions 
to open-ended problems. Although divergent thinking is often considered to be 
synonymous with creativity in the literature, Cropley (2006) suggests that convergent 
thinking is also important in creativity, in order to ensure a novel idea is fit for purpose.        49 
 
It has been suggested that traits such as risk taking, emotionality, sensation seeking, 
impulsivity and day dreaming  describe creative individuals as well as those with 
ADHD, and that creativity and ADHD may be “overlapping syndromes” (Cramond, 
1994, p.196). It follows then that if behavioural traits of ADHD overlap with those of 
creativity, individuals high in ADHD symptomology may show superior performance 
on creative tasks than controls. There has been some attempt to empirically investigate 
this notion within the literature. For example, Shaw and Brown (1990) found that pupils 
aged between 10 and 13 years who were identified by teachers as being high in 
inattentiveness and hyperactivity, performed significantly better on a subtest of figural 
creativity taken from the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking (TTCT; Torrance, 1966, 
2006) than controls. However, no significant differences were found between the two 
groups in terms of verbal creativity. The authors acknowledge a potential selection bias 
in their teacher selected control group towards pupils displaying “strong conformity and 
extreme diligence” (p. 52). It is possible therefore, that the control group in this study 
was not representative of the normal population. In addition, participants high in ADHD 
symptomology were not identified using standardised rating scale, instead subjective 
teacher, Head teacher or school psychologist judgements were used.  When the authors 
selected participants based on a standardised rating scale of ADHD symptomology 
(Connor’s rating scale) in a subsequent study, individuals high in ADHD 
symptomology performed significantly better on tests of figural creativity than controls 
(Shaw & Brown, 1991).  More recently, Healey and Rucklige (2006) found that in a 
sample of 10-12 year olds, 40% of children identified as being creative displayed 
elevated levels of ADHD symptomology, which is consistent with the notion that 
creativity and ADHD symptoms may overlap. 
 In addition, White and Shah (2006) compared the performance of adults with a 
diagnosis of ADHD on two measures of creativity: the Unusual Uses Test (UUT; a 
measure of divergent thinking) and the Remote Associates Test (RAT; a measure of 
convergent thinking). The authors found that individuals with a diagnosis of ADHD 
performed better on the test of divergent thinking but worse on the test of convergent 
thinking than non–ADHD controls, which suggests that the benefits associated with 
ADHD symptomology may be limited to particular kinds of creativity tests, namely 
those requiring open ended responses. However, some researchers have found no group 
differences between children high in ADHD symptomology and those low in ADHD       50 
 
symptomology on tests of creativity such as the TTCT and insight problems (Healey & 
Rucklidge, 2008), which suggests the need for further research in this area. 
In short, there appears to be some preliminary evidence supporting a putative link 
between ADHD and symptomology, and the following section highlights some key 
points of overlap between theoretical models of creativity and ADHD which may 
account for these findings. 
 
2.1.1. Theoretical considerations- the role of defocused attention and inhibition 
deficits 
Why should creativity and ADHD be associated? It seems plausible to suggest 
that creative individuals and those high in ADHD symptomology may by united by 
common cognitive factors. The case for defocused attention and inhibition deficits in 
creativity and ADHD will now be presented.  
    Inattentiveness is a core feature of ADHD and attentional processes have also 
been implicated in the creativity literature. For example, Martindale (1995) 
reconceptualised Mednick’s (1962) associative model of creativity in terms of 
conceptual attention. Mednick (1962) initially hypothesised that creative responses 
involve the juxtaposition of remotely associated ideas. It has been suggested that 
creative individuals are more successful in producing original ideas because they have a 
“flat associative hierarchy”; unusual combinations of ideas are just as likely to be 
activated as more conventional ideas (Mednick, 1962, p. 223).  Martindale (1995) 
suggested that  individuals who  have a broad focus of conceptual attention (so called 
“defocused attention”; p. 245), would be more successful in uniting remote associates 
than individuals who are less able to attend to a broad range of concepts simultaneously. 
According to Martindale (1995) “defocused attention versus flat associative hierarchies 
are cognitive and behaviouristic ways of describing exactly the same phenomenon” (p. 
247).  There has been some support for the role of defocused attention in creativity. For 
example, when participants were primed to adopt a broad scope of perceptual attention 
they were able to generate more novel responses on a measure of divergent thinking 
than those who were primed to adopt a narrow scope of perceptual attention (Friedman 
et al. 2003). However, it has been claimed that whilst defocused attention is important 
in the initial stages of the creative process, individuals must also be able to focus their 
attention in the latter stages in order to refine their creative product and ensure that it is 
fit for purpose (Ansburg & Hill, 2003). Given that individuals high in ADHD       51 
 
symptomology experience difficulties in sustaining attention, it seems plausible suggest 
that such individuals may struggle with this aspect of creative thinking. Indeed, 
Abraham et al. (2006) found that individuals with a diagnosis of ADHD were less able 
to generate a novel yet functional invention on a creative imagery task than controls 
(Abraham et al. 2006). In short, there appears to be some evidence implicating the role 
of defocused attention in creativity, which parallels the notion of “inattentiveness” in 
the ADHD literature. 
In addition to the role of defocused attention, it seems that creative individuals 
and those high in ADHD symptomology may share deficits in inhibitory control. 
Indeed, Eynseck (1995) hypothesised that individuals who have reduced levels of 
cognitive inhibition, would be more likely to form creative associations. There is some 
empirical support for the role of inhibition in creativity as Carson et al. (2003) found 
that high lifetime creative achievers were significantly more likely to demonstrate 
deficits in inhibition than low lifetime creative achievers. In addition, Carson et al. 
(2003) found that individuals who demonstrated reduced levels of inhibition produced 
significantly more original responses on a test of divergent thinking than individuals 
who demonstrated higher levels of inhibition.  
Deficits in inhibitory control have also been associated with ADHD in the 
literature (see Willcutt et al. 2005, for a review) and form the basis of Barkley’s (1997) 
executive function deficit theory of ADHD.  According to Barkley (1992), deficits in 
behavioural inhibition (i.e. the ability to halt a pre-potent response) cause secondary 
deficits in four other areas of EF: “a) working memory; b) self-regulation of affect 
motivation and arousal; c) internalisation of speech and d) reconstitution (behavioural 
analysis and synthesis)” (p. 65). These secondary deficits in EF in turn are hypothesised 
to impact on an individual’s ability to engage in appropriate goal directed behaviour, 
thus increasing the likelihood of inattentiveness or hyperactivity.  
 It seems plausible to suggest that inhibitory deficits may be a common factor in 
creativity and ADHD. Indeed, White and Shah (2006) investigated the role of inhibition 
on two aspects of creativity: divergent and convergent thinking in a sample of adults 
with a diagnosis of ADHD. They hypothesised that low inhibitory control would 
facilitate performance on divergent thinking tasks as “concepts and ideas are less likely 
to be inhibited” (p. 1123). By contrast, White and Shah (2006) hypothesised that high 
inhibitory control would facilitate performance on convergent thinking, given the need       52 
 
to inhibit incorrect “partial solutions” (p. 1122).  Results indicated that individuals with 
a diagnosis of ADHD performed better than controls on the measure of divergent 
thinking, but worse than controls on the measure of convergent thinking. In addition, 
the authors found that differences in inhibition (as measured by the semantic inhibition 
of return task) statistically mediated the relationship between ADHD symptomology 
and performance on the convergent thinking task. However, an unexpected finding 
emerged with respect to divergent thinking: differences in inhibition did not mediate the 
relationship between ADHD symptomology and divergent thinking. The authors 
suggest that this latter finding may be related to the type of inhibition task used in the 
study and hypothesise that “ADHD-related inhibitory deficits not assessed in the present 
study, and/or characteristics of ADHD unrelated to inhibition, may contribute to better 
divergent thinking ability in individuals with ADHD” (p. 1128). Indeed, it is possible 
that replicating White and Shah’s (2006) study with a different measure of inhibition 
may give different findings with respect to the mediating role of inhibition in divergent 
thinking.  
  Such a formulation however, may be overly simplistic given the heterogeneity 
of ADHD symptom presentation. Inhibition deficits alone are neither sufficient nor 
necessary to lead to ADHD (Wilcutt et al. 2005). Some  individuals who show high 
levels of ADHD symptomology have been found to  show a preference for smaller 
sooner rewards, over larger later rewards (Luman et al. 2005), a phenomenon known as 
delay aversion. Sonuga-Barke’s (2002) dual pathway model of ADHD attempts to 
reconcile these apparently divergent findings. His model describes two potential 
pathways in ADHD: the dysregulation of thought and action pathway (DTAP) and the 
motivational style pathway (MSP). The DTAP places deficits in inhibitory control as a 
primary symptom of ADHD, which leads to behavioural dyresgulation and the 
manifestation of behavioural symptoms such as inattentiveness, impulsivity and 
hyperactivity. Inhibition deficits are also hypothesised to lead to cognitive 
dysregulation, which in turn leads to poor task engagement. Behavioural symptoms of 
ADHD and task engagement are thought to interact via a feedback loop. The MSP 
specifies that delay aversion is a product of the motivation pathway. It is suggested that 
individuals may become delay averse if they have biologically “altered reward 
mechanisms” regarding the perceived value of delayed rewards, in combination with 
negative experiences of delay (such as being subjected to unreasonably high 
expectations to tolerate delay in their early years). Delay aversion is then hypothesised       53 
 
to lead to ADHD symptoms, as the individual attempts to reduce their experience of 
delay either by attending to other stimuli (inattentiveness) or creating their own motor 
stimulation (hyperactivity).  
 
2.1.2. The creative advantage hypothesis 
The creative advantage hypothesis predicts that ADHD symptomology may lead 
to superior creative performance, specifically on tests of divergent thinking. It is 
predicted that defocused attention may increase the likelihood of an individual 
associating two conceptually remote ideas together, thus predisposing those with 
ADHD symptomology to perform better on tasks that require novel responses. Although 
this hypothesis clearly implicates the role of inattentiveness on creativity, no prediction 
is made regarding the independent contribution of hyperactivity on creativity.  
In addition, the creative advantage hypothesis sets up secondary predictions 
regarding potential mediators of the relationship between ADHD symptomology and 
creativity: 
1)   Given the suggestion in the literature implicating the role of inhibition deficits 
in both creativity and ADHD, it is assumed that any benefits ADHD populations 
experience in terms of creativity may be mediated by cognitive deficits in 
inhibitory control. It is suggested that individuals with inhibition deficits are 
more likely to be creative because unusual ideas are less likely to be screened 
from consciousness.  
2)  It is possible that delay aversion may also mediate the relationship between 
ADHD symptomology and divergent thinking, given that delay aversion has 
been hypothesised to lead to inattentiveness in ADHD. Although this aspect of 
the creative advantage hypothesis remains speculative at present, perhaps 
individuals with delay aversion may be more creative than those who are not 
delay averse, as the former may be motivated to produce multiple ideas (thus 
increasing the chances of original responses) in order to reduce their experience 
of delay.        54 
 
The creative advantage hypothesis assumes that as inhibition deficits and delay 
aversion independently lead to inattentiveness (defocused attention) in ADHD, they 
may have similar effects on divergent thinking. The current study seeks to discriminate 
between these two potential mediators, although it is acknowledged that the case for 
inhibition deficits is somewhat stronger than the case for delay aversion, given previous 
evidence implicating the role of inhibition deficits in both ADHD and creativity. 
 
2.1.3. Aims and hypotheses 
The current study seeks to test the “creative advantage hypothesis”, in order to 
contribute to the growing literature base. In particular, the current study seeks to build 
on the findings of White and Shah (2006) with a younger sample of participants and 
explore whether their results can be extended using a figural measure of creativity, a 
computerised test of motor response inhibition and a delay aversion task.  
There is a relative lack of research exploring creativity in young adolescent 
populations. Given evidence indicating that creativity tends to increase with age 
(Torrance, 1968, Besancon & Lubart, 2008), but dips during transition to the first year 
of  secondary school (Lau & Cheung, 2010), the current study explores the creative 
abilities of pupils in the second year of their secondary education (i.e. Year 8 in the UK 
educational system).  
There is evidence to suggest that ADHD is more prevalent in boys than girls 
(APA, 2000) and girls are generally rated as “less symptomatic” than boys by both 
parents and teachers (Newcorn et al. 2001, p. 144). If an association does indeed exist 
between creativity and ADHD symptoms, it would be harder to find in girls than boys, 
because of the restricted range of ADHD symptoms in girls. The responses of boys and 
girls will therefore be analysed together and separately in this study. The creative 
advantage hypothesis can be falsified though exploration of six testable predictions 
which will become the focus of this study: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Inattentiveness should correlate positively with pupils’ scores on a 
test of divergent thinking. 
Hypothesis 2:  Inhibition deficits should correlate positively with ADHD 
symptomology and divergent thinking.       55 
 
Hypothesis 3: Delay aversion should correlate positively with ADHD 
symptomology and may correlate with divergent thinking. 
Hypothesis 4: ADHD symptomology should significantly predict pupils’ scores 
on a test of divergent thinking. 
Hypothesis 5: The relationship between ADHD symptomology and divergent 
thinking should be independently mediated by differences in inhibition 
Hypothesis 6: The relationship between ADHD symptomology and divergent 
thinking may alternatively be mediated by delay aversion. 
 
In addition, the impact of gender on ADHD symptoms will also be considered: 
 
Hypothesis 7: Boys should show higher levels of ADHD symptomology than 
girls. 
 
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Design 
A correlational design was used to explore the relationship between parental ratings of 
inattentiveness and hyperactivity/impulsivity on the SNAP-IV (predictor variables) and 
creativity subscale scores on the TTCT (outcome variables). Inhibition deficits (number 
of commission errors on the Go No Go task) and delay aversion (percentage of short 
delay reward choices on a delay aversion task) acted as mediator variables. Participants 
within the same year group (Year 8) were recruited from three secondary schools on the 
basis of opt-in parental consent and parental completion of the SNAP-IV rating scale. 
Participants completed the TTCT, Go No Go task and a delay aversion task in groups of 
three, during a one hour testing session in school. 
 
2.2.2 Participants 
Participants were recruited from three secondary schools, in three different 
geographical regions
2. The parents of pupils in Year 8 (N=608) were approached and 
                                                           
2 Due to difficulties in recruiting participants, it was necessary to extend the geographical range of the 
study to include schools in three different Local Authorities. Local Authorities were approached where       56 
 
14.4% (N=87) agreed for their child to take part in the study. Parents were advised that 
if their child was currently taking medication for ADHD, they would not be eligible to 
participate in the study
3. Parents who indicated their consent were subsequently sent an 
ADHD rating scale. Sixty nine parents completed and returned the rating scale giving a 
79.3% response uptake. Pupils whose parents had completed the rating scale were then 
invited to participate in the second phase of the study. One pupil did not attempt the test 
battery due to a diagnosis of epilepsy
4  and a further two pupils were absent on the day 
of testing.  Sixty six pupils in total made up the final sample. Participants were therefore 
recruited on the basis of parental consent to take part in the study and parental 
completion of an ADHD rating scale.  Pupils who participated in the study ranged in 
age between 12 years 4 months and 13 years 4 months (M= 12 years 9 months, SD= 
3.00 months). There was an even gender split in the sample (male N=33; female N=33).  
 
2.2.3 Measures 
2.2.3.1 SNAP-IV. The SNAP-IV (Swanson, 1992) is a 90 item measure of 
inattentiveness and hyperactivity which can be completed by teachers or parents. Items 
1-18 reflect the DSM-IV criteria for ADHD; items 19-39 measure activity and attention 
levels as well as Oppositional Defiant Disorder. Items 39-90 set out exclusion criteria 
for a diagnosis of ADHD, tapping behaviours associated with non-ADHD conditions 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the author  had prior employment experience.   Participants were therefore recruited from one school in  
Bracknell Forest (N=27), one school in North Hampshire (N=17) and one school in South Wales (N=22). 
 
3 There is some evidence to suggest that stimulant medications (e.g. methylphenidate), which are 
commonly prescribed to help ADHD children sustain attention,  may actually reduce “cognitive 
flexibility” in some individuals (Tannock & Schachar, 1992; Swartwood et al 2003 but  see  Tannock, 
Schachar & Logan, 1995), which may have implications for creative thinking. As a precautionary 
measure, pupils who were taking medication for ADHD were excluded from the study in order to avoid 
introducing a potential confound into the study.  
 
4 Given that the fast presentation of the stimuli in the Go No Go task could be perceived as  a “flashing” 
stimulus, participants were asked at the start of the study if they had a diagnosis or epilepsy or were 
sensitive to flashing lights. Pupils who indicated that they were sensitive to flashing lights were asked to 
return to lessons without completing the study as a precautionary measure.       57 
 
such as Tourette’s Disorder and Obsessive Compulsive Disorder among others.  For the 
purposes of this study, only items 1 to 18 were used as a measure of inattentiveness and 
hyperactivity (Appendix A). The response format of the SNAP-IV is a 4 point Likert 
scale (Not at All = 0, Just A Little = 1, Quite A Bit = 2, and Very Much = 3), where 
parents indicate the extent to which their child displays the behaviour in question. 
Subscale scores for inattentiveness and hyperactivity are expressed as an average rating-
per-item. Bussing, Mason, Bell, Porter and Garvan (2008) explored the reliability of 
parents and teacher ratings on a shortened version of the SNAP-IV, which consisted of 
26 items (18 DSM-IV descriptors of inattentiveness and hyperactivity, and 8 items 
relating to ODD). They found that overall, this measure possessed excellent reliability 
both in terms of parent (r=.94) and teacher (r=.97) ratings. Solanto and Alvir (2009) also 
found that the 39 item measure possesses slightly higher internal reliability than 
Connor’s Revised Questionnaire for ADHD diagnosis
5.  
2.2.3.2 Torrance Test of Creative Thinking (TTCT). The TTCT comes in two 
forms: the figural and verbal, where participants are asked to respond to a number of 
open ended tasks incorporating figural or verbal stimuli respectively. Only the figural 
version of the TTCT will be discussed here. The Figural TTCT is a measure of 
divergent thinking, which was initially published in 1966 and has been subsequently re-
normed in 1974, 1984, 1990, 1998 and 2007. Participants are asked to complete three 
drawing based tasks lasting 10 minutes each and are encouraged to “think of ideas that 
no-one else will think of” (Torrance, 2008a, p.2). During the first activity, “Picture 
Construction”, participants are required to draw a picture incorporating an ‘egg’ shaped 
stimulus. This is followed by “Picture Completion”, where participants are presented 
with ten incomplete figures and asked to transform as many of these as they can into 
interesting pictures. Finally, participants are presented with the “Lines” activity, where 
they are required to make as many interesting objects or pictures as they can from 30 
pairs of parallel lines.  For each activity, participants are also asked to label each of their 
drawings with an imaginative title. Responses are scored for:  
                                                           
5 In line with dimensional view of ADHD adopted in this paper, the SNAP-IV scale encourages raters to 
indicate where on the continuum of symptom severity the participant lies.        58 
 
  Fluency, which translates as the number of legitimate responses (i.e. appropriate 
use of stimulus material) given per activity. Only Picture Completion and Lines 
are scored for fluency as Picture Construction consists of a single item. 
   Originality, which reflects the number of statistically rare ideas given. The 
scoring manual provides a list of common responses which are given a score of 
zero; all other legitimate responses are given a score of one. 
   Elaboration, which reflects the extent to which ideas have been developed. 
Responses are scored in terms of the number of additions to each drawing 
which go beyond the essential elements. The number of additions is converted 
to a score through reference to a table in the scoring manual. 
   Abstractness of Titles, which captures the use of abstract or metaphorical 
language in titles given to drawings. Responses are given a score of between 0 
and 3 depending on how far the title moves beyond a concrete description of the 
drawing. 
   Resistance to Premature Closure, which refers to the ability to be 
psychologically open-minded when considering ways to complete tasks. It 
reflects the  ability to withhold the temptation to ‘close’ incomplete figural 
stimuli prematurely in Activities 2 and 3 with a direct line or simple curve.   
 
Raw scores are converted into standard scores (M=100, SD=20) with reference to 
age appropriate tables provided in the Norms Technical Manual (Torrance, 2008b). In 
addition to the basic scoring procedures outlined above, participants responses can also 
be scored in term of 13 creative strengths:  emotional expressiveness; storytelling 
articulateness; movement or action; expressiveness of titles; synthesis of incomplete 
figures; synthesis of lines or circles; unusual visualization; internal visualization; 
extending or breaking boundaries; humour; richness of imagery; colourfulness of 
imagery, and fantasy (Torrance, 2008a). According to the manual, creative strengths can 
be added to the average of participants’ standard score in order to give a value known as 
the “Creative Index”.  Due to time constraints, only the norm referenced scoring 
procedure for the subtests and the average standard score was used in this study.  
The TTCT is one of the most widely used measure of creativity in the literature 
(Davis, 1997). The measure has been most recently normed in 2007, and Kuder       59 
 
Richardson 21 reliability estimates for average creativity scores range from .85 to .93 
across the 5 to 16 year age range (Torrance, 2008b). 
 
2.2.3.3 Go No Go task.  Bitsakou et al.’s (2008) Go No Go task was used to index 
inhibition deficits. The programme was made compatible with Windows 7 Operating 
System, but the content remained unchanged. In this computer based task, participants 
are presented with left or right pointing arrows and asked to press the corresponding left 
or right button on the computer keyboard.  “Go trials” make up 75% of trials and 
require individuals to press the appropriate key when presented with either left or right 
pointing green  arrows. For 25% of trials, individuals are presented with the “No Go” 
stimulus: a green double-headed arrow, and must inhibit their motor response and 
refrain from pressing any key on the computer keyboard. In the current study, the 
number of trials where the participants erroneously responded to a No Go trial (i.e. 
commission errors) was used as an index of inhibition deficit.  Participants completed 
100 trials, and for all stimuli the inter-stimulus interval was 1500 ms (100ms stimulus 
duration, followed by a blank screen for 1400ms). According to Bistakou et al. (2008) 
the test-retest reliability of this task is “moderate (intra-class correlation= 0.61; 
Bitsakou, 2007, unpublished data)” (p. 264). 
 
2.2.3.4 Delay aversion task. Maudsley’s Index of Childhood Delay Aversion 
(MIDA; Kuntsi, Stevenson, Oosterlaan & Sonuga-Barke, 2001), was adapted in order to 
make it compatible with Windows 7 Operating System. This game-like computer task 
requires pupils to ‘shoot’ target spaceships which move slowly across the screen. Pupils 
are given a choice of when to shoot spaceships over a course of 20 trials, where waiting 
for a short delay before shooting scores one point and waiting for a long delay before 
shooting scores two points. In Kunsti et al’s (2001) original task, participants were 
required to wait for 2 seconds in order to gain one point, and 30 seconds in order to gain 
two points. In the current study, for practical reasons the interval of the long delay 
option was reduced. Consequently, the period of time pupils were required to wait in 
order to gain two points was reduced to a 10 seconds
6. In order to gain one point, pupils 
                                                           
6 It was felt that the cumulative effect of multiple 30 second delays would have a negative effect on 
pupils’ interest and engagement levels and hence overestimate the number of pupils identified as being 
delay averse. In addition, reducing the period of long delay was appropriate for pragmatic reasons, given 
pressures on the researcher to ensure that the test battery could be completed comfortably within one       60 
 
were required to wait 2 seconds.  Prior to the onset of 20 trials, participants were 
exposed to two practice trials. The percentage of short delay reward choices was used  
as an indicator of delay aversion.  
Kunsti et al’s (2001) original measure has been found to have a satisfactory test-
retest reliability based on partial correlations (.69) (Kunsti, Stevenson, Oosterlan & 
Sonuga-Barke, 2001) and good discriminant validity (Kunsti et al. 2001).  However, it 
has been found that intelligence may be a moderating factor on performance on the 
MIDA (Bitsakou, Psychogiou, Thompson & Sonuga-Barke, 2009). 
 
2.2.4 Procedure 
Ethical approval was granted by the University of Southampton Ethics 
Committee (Study ID=844, Appendix B1, B2). Head teachers of six secondary schools 
in Bracknell Forest Local Authority, 11 secondary schools in Hampshire and one 
secondary school in Wales were approached by telephone and email and invited to 
participate in the study. One school from each region agreed to take part, and opt in 
consent forms (Appendix C) and information sheets (Appendix D) were sent to the 
parents of all pupils in Year 8 (N=603). Parents were given at least a fortnight to return 
consent slips to school. School staff were then given a range of pass numbers to allocate 
to each pupil whose parents consented for their participation. In order to ensure linked 
anonymity, schools were instructed to keep a list of pupil names and pass numbers; the 
researcher only had access to the list of pass numbers. The researcher ensured that the 
appropriate pass number was written on the SNAP-IV before sending to parents via 
school staff. Parents were provided with a deadline to return the questionnaire in the 
stamped addressed envelope provided.  During the second phase of data collection, 
pupils whose parents had completed the SNAP-IV were invited to a one hour testing 
session in their school. Pupils were tested in groups of three, with up to nine pupils 
                                                                                                                                                                          
lesson. Delay aversion tasks specify different lengths of long delay, and values range from 10 seconds 
(Bitsakou, Antrop, Wieserman & Sonuga-Barke, 2006) to 30 seconds (Kunsti et al. 2001) within the 
literature; the more conservative estimate of delay aversion (10 seconds) was therefore chosen for this 
exploratory study. The researcher checked the distribution of pupils’ scores on the delay aversion task 
after the first two days testing (N=18), and noted the range of scores collected. The distribution of pupils’ 
scores was judged to be approaching normality and so a decision was made to continue using this task in 
the adapted format.        61 
 
being tested per day. At the beginning of each testing session the researcher outlined the 
purpose of the study and pupils’ written assent was sought (Appendix E). Pupils who 
reported that they were sensitive to flashing lights and/or had a diagnosis of epilepsy 
were asked to return to lessons. Pupils then completed three tasks, the Figural TTCT for 
30 minutes, and two computer based tasks: the delay aversion task for 10 minutes and 
Go No Go task for approximately 5 minutes. Across the sample, tasks were counter 
balanced in order to reduce order effects.  Participants were asked to record their pass 
number manually on the TTCT form and the researcher logged pupils’ pass numbers 
when prompted by the computerised Go No Go and the delay aversion tasks. Pupils’ 
participation on the delay aversion task was rewarded with small stationery items. 
Participants were provided with a written debrief form to take home and thanked for 
their participation (Appendix F). 
 
2.2.5 Analysis 
   Parental ratings of inattentiveness and hyperactivity on the SNAP-IV were 
linked to participants’ performance on the computer tasks and the TTCT standard scores 
via the pass number system.  All data was entered into SPSS for analysis. The raw data 
was screened for univariate outliers through conversion to z-scores (M=0, SD=1) and 
visual inspection of box plots for each variable. One data point had a z-score of above 
3.29 and was classed as a significant outlier as recommended by Field (2009). This data 
point was replaced with a value corresponding to 3 SD above the mean. Missing data on 
the SNAP-IV (N=2) was dealt with by calculating an average rating per item for items 
answered. The distribution of the data set was then checked for normality both visually 
(using histograms and p-plots) and quantitatively, using the Shapiro-Wilk test.  
Participants’ median scores were then calculated for all the variables across the 
whole sample and split by gender. A one tailed non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test 
was used to explore the significance of gender on participants’ SNAP-IV scores and  a 
two tailed Mann Whitney U Test was used to explore the significance of gender on the 
remaining variables. Effect sizes for Mann-Whitney estimates were also calculated. The 
reliability of the SNAP-IV was also calculated.        62 
 
A one-tailed Spearman’s correlation was carried out between: inattentiveness 
and creativity; delay aversion and creativity, and inhibition and creativity, across the 
whole sample and split by gender. A two-tailed Spearman’s correlation was carried out 
between: ADHD combined scores and creativity; hyperactivity and creativity; creativity 
subtests, and subscale scores on the SNAP-IV, across the whole sample and split by 
gender
7. In order to correct for multiple correlations and Mann Whitney U comparisons 
a False Discovery Rate correction was applied for both forms of analysis
8.   
    Hierarchical multiple regression was then conducted to explore the role of 
ADHD symptomology on relevant creativity subtests. Parental ratings of inattentiveness 
and hyperactivity were both entered into subsequent regression models as potential 
predictors, as jointly they can be considered a proxy for ADHD. However, given that 
the creativity advantage hypothesis emphasises the role of defocused attention in 
creativity, participants’ inattentiveness scores were entered first into the regression 
equation, followed by hyperactivity. In order to avoid violating the assumption of 
singularity, only subscale scores for inattentiveness and hyperactivity were entered into 
the regression equation (and not total scores on SNAP-IV). This also allowed the 
researcher scope to explore the relative contributions of inattentiveness and 
                                                           
7 As recommended by Field (2009) effect sizes were calculated for Mann Whitney U Tests using the 
formula: 
 r= Z/ √N    (where Z= z-score and N= sample size).  
 
8 When conducting multiple comparisons, the likelihood of making Type 1 errors increases. A Bonferroni 
correction is often applied in such circumstances in order to reduce the familywise error rate. Some 
authors have argued that the Bonferroni correction can be too conservative (e.g. Bland & Altman, 1995), 
and increase the likelihood of making Type 2 errors. Indeed in this study, applying a Bonferroni 
correction for multiple correlations (0.05/165) and would specify a corrected p value of =.0003.  A less 
conservative method of multiple correction involving sequential Bonferroni type calculations was used in 
the current paper in order to control for the number of falsely rejected null hypotheses: the False 
Discovery Rate (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). In this procedure, observed  p values for all comparisons 
are ranked  ( with lower numbers indicating smaller p values) and entered into the following equation:  
  
   (where P= uncorrected p value, i=rank, m=total number of comparisons, and q*= 0.05) 
The highest p value to satisfy the constraint becomes the corrected p value for the sample.        63 
 
hyperactivity on creativity
9. Post hoc power calculations were conducted for significant 
regression models using an on-line multiple regression power calculator, (retrieved 
from: http://www.danielsoper.com/statcalc3/calc.aspx?id=9). 
 Mediational analysis was then attempted as outlined by Baron and Kenny 
(1986). Baron and Kenny (1986) stipulate 4 conditions that must be fulfilled during 
mediational analysis:  1) The independent variable(s) (IV) must predict the proposed 
mediator, 2) The IV(s) must predict the dependent variable (DV), 3) the mediator must 
predict the DV whilst controlling for the IV(s), 4) the effect of the IV(s) on the DV in 
regression 3 must either non-significant or smaller than in regression 2. 
2.3. Results 
2.3.1  Descriptive statistics 
Visual inspection of histograms indicated that the majority of variables were 
non-normally distributed across the whole sample. The  Shapiro–Wilk test confirmed 
that the distribution of following variables was significantly non-normal: mean rating 
per item on the inattentiveness subscale of the SNAP-IV (W60=.925, p=.001); mean 
rating  per item on the hyperactivity subscale of the SNAP-IV (W60=.893, p<.001); 
mean total rating per item on the SNAP-IV (W60=. 916, p=.001); percentage short delay 
reward choices on delay aversion task (W60=.753, p<.001); elaboration scores on the  
TTCT (W60=.853, p<.001),  abstractness of titles scores on the TTCT (W60=.941, 
p=.006) and number of commission errors on Go No Go task (W60=.947, p=.011).  By 
contrast, fluency (W60=.986, p=.741); originality (W60=.976, p=.398); resistance to 
premature closure (W60=.981, p=.489), and mean creativity standard scores on the 
TTCT (W60= .984, p=.612) did not differ significantly from normal. 
                                                           
9 According to Green (1991), the minimum sample size necessary to test the overall model can be 
estimated using the formula 50 + 8k (where k is the number of predictors). The minimum sample size 
required to test the contribution of individual predictors can be estimated using the formula 104 + k 
(where k is the number of predictors). As the current study will attempt to test both the overall model and 
the contribution of the individual predictors Green (1991) recommends that both formulas be calculated, 
and the largest minimum sample size used. The sample size of this study does not meet the minimum 
sample size (N=106) required and so the results of subsequent multiple regression analysis should be 
interpreted with caution.       64 
 
In boys, visual inspection of histograms indicated that the majority of variables 
were non-normally distributed. The Shapiro-Wilk test confirmed that the following 
variables were significantly non-normally distributed:  mean rating per item on the 
inattentiveness subscale of the SNAP-IV (W(33) =.919, p=.017); mean rating per item on 
the hyperactivity subscale of the SNAP-IV (W(33)= .932, p=.040); mean total rating per 
item on the SNAP-IV (W(33)= .900, p=.005); percentage short delay reward choice 
(W(33)=.743, p<.001); elaboration scores on the TTCT (W(33)=.754, p<.001); 
abstractedness of titles score on TTCT (W(33)=.905, p=.007) and number of commission 
errors on Go No Go task (W(33)= .926, p=.026). By contrast, fluency (W(33) =.984, 
p=.892); originality (W(33)=.975, p=.638); resistance to premature closure (W(33)= .970, 
p=.481) and mean creativity scores on the TTCT (W(33)=.981, p=.827)  did not differ 
significantly from normal. 
In girls, visual inspection of histograms indicated that the majority of variables 
were non-normally distributed. The Shapiro-Wilk test confirmed that the following 
variables were significantly non-normally distributed: mean rating per item on the 
inattentiveness subscale of the SNAP-IV (W(33) =.878, p=.001); mean rating per item on 
the hyperactivity subscale of the SNAP-IV (W(33)= .789, p<.001); mean total rating per 
item on the SNAP-IV (W(33)= .847, p<.001); percentage short delay reward choice 
(W(33)=.810, p<.001); elaboration scores on the TTCT (W(33)=.883, p=.002); 
abstractedness of titles score on TTCT (W(33)=.934, p=.044) and number of commission 
errors on Go No Go task (W(33)= .935, p=.049). By contrast, fluency (W(33)=.990, 
p=.984); originality (W(33)=.968, p=.429); resistance to premature closure (W(33)= .974, 
p=.613) and mean creativity scores on the TTCT (W(33)=.985, p=.927)  did not differ 
significantly from normal. 
Participants’ median scores on the SNAP-IV questionnaire, delay aversion task, 
TTCT and Go No Go task across the whole sample are presented in Table 1.  
Participants’ median scores on the same measures split by gender are presented in Table 
2.       65 
 
Table 1 
 Median scores on SNAP-IV questionnaire, delay aversion task, TTCT, and Go No Go 
task (whole sample) 
 
  Mdn.  Range 
SNAP-IV 
 Inattentiveness 
 
0.78 
 
2.67 
 Hyperactivity  0.44  2.26 
Combined 
 
Neuropsychological tests 
0.64  2.22 
% Short delay reward choice on 
delay aversion task 
Number commission errors on 
Go No Go task 
 
TTCT standard scores 
10.0 
 
7.5 
85.0 
 
23.0 
Fluency    99.50  82.00 
Originality   98.00  79.00 
Elaboration  73.00  46.00 
Abstractness of titles   82.00  76.00 
Resistance to premature closure   84.00  81.00 
 Mean creativity score  87.60  43.00 
     
     
Note. Inattentiveness= mean rating per item on SNAP-IV inattentiveness subscale, 
Hyperactivity= mean rating per item on SNAP-IV subscale, Combined= total mean 
rating per item on SNAP-IV; TTCT= Torrance Test of Creative Thinking (Figural). 
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Table 2 
 Median scores on SNAP-IV questionnaire, delay aversion task, TTCT, and Go No Go 
task (by gender) 
 
 
Gender  Mdn.  Range 
SNAP-IV 
Inattentiveness 
     
Male  0.89  2.56 
Female  0.44  2.44 
Hyperactivity   Male  0.56  1.78 
Female  0.22  2.26 
Combined 
 
 
Neuropsychological tasks 
Male 
Female 
0.78 
0.39 
1.89 
2.22 
     
     
% Short delay reward choice on 
delay aversion task 
 
Number of commission errors  on 
Go No Go task 
 
TTCT standard scores 
Male  10.0  85.0 
Female 
 
Male 
Female 
10.0 
 
 8.0 
7.0 
60.0 
  
 23.0 
17.0 
     
Fluency    Male  104.00  74.00 
Female  96.00  74.00 
Originality   Male  98.00   79.00 
Female  98.00  79.00 
Elaboration   Male  73.00   46.00 
Female  73.00  36.00 
Abstractness of titles  Male  82.00   76.00 
Female  82.00   67.00 
Resistance to premature closure   Male  79.00   81.00 
Female  88.00  75.00 
Mean creativity standard score 
 
Male 
Female 
86.00 
87.60 
41.40 
41.00 
Note. Inattentiveness= mean rating per item on SNAP-IV inattentiveness subscale, 
Hyperactivity= mean rating per item on SNAP-IV subscale, Combined= total mean 
rating per item on SNAP-IV; TTCT= Torrance Test of Creative Thinking (Figural).       67 
 
Males were rated as being significantly more inattentive (U= 353.50, z=-2.453, 
p=.007, r = -.30) and hyperactive than females (U= 328.00, z= -2.791, p=.002, r = -.34) 
on the SNAP-IV.  Males’ combined inattentive/hyperactivity score on the SNAP-IV 
was also higher than females’ (U=295, z= -3.204, p=.001, r =.-.39). These findings 
remained significant at the p≤.007 level, when multiple comparisons were corrected 
using False Discovery Rate procedure. Percentage of short delay reward choices in 
males did not differ significantly from females (U= 542.5, z= -.026, p=.982, r= -.003) 
on the delay aversion task. Number of commission errors on the Go No Go task did not 
differ significantly between males and females (U=523, z= -.270, p=.791, r= -.03). 
Levels of fluency (U=463.00, z= -1.046, p=.299, r= -.13) ; originality (U=525.50, z= -
.244, p=.811, r= -.03), elaboration (U=396.50, z= -1.953, p=.051, r= -.24),  
abstractedness of titles (U=508.5, z= -.465, p=.647, r= -. 05); resistance to premature 
closure scores (U=412.00 z= -1.704, p=.089, r= -.20) and mean creativity scores 
(U=481, z= -.814, p=.420, r= - .10) on the TTCT did not differ significantly between 
males  and females.  
 
2.3.2 Reliability of the SNAP-IV 
Cronbach’s alpha for the entire measure (18 items, α = .920) and the 
inattentiveness subscale (9 items α =.920) were both found to be excellent. The 
Cronbach’s alpha for the hyperactivity scale (9 items, α =.863) indicated that the 
internal reliability of this subscale was good. 
 
2.3.3. Correlational analysis 
After correcting for multiple correlations the adjusted significance value was set 
at p<.004. No significant correlations were observed between ADHD symptomology 
(inattentiveness, hyperactivity) and creativity scores across the whole sample (Table 3). 
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Table 3 
 Spearman’s rank correlations between SNAP-IV scores, percentage short delay choices and creativity subtests across whole sample. 
  Inattentiveness  Hyperactivity  Combined  % Short 
delay 
choices 
Commission 
errors 
Fluency  Originality  Elaboration  Abstractedness of 
titles 
Resistance 
to premature 
closure 
M 
creativity  
Inattentiveness  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Hyperactivity  .494
†  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Combined  .827
†  .725
†  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
% Short delay 
choices 
.091  .098  .113  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Commission errors  .061  .027  .013  -.229  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Fluency  .243  .031  .094  -.138  .134  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Originality  .157  -.020  .029  .076  .070  .797
†  -  -  -  -  - 
Elaboration  -.118  -.125  -.153  -.274  -.143  -.091  -.158  -  -  -  - 
Abstractedness of 
titles 
-.136  .054  -.048  .135  -.007  -.031  .017  -.159  -  -  - 
Resistance to 
premature closure 
.075  -.129  -.045  -.222  .060  .542
†  .472
†  .000  .047  -  - 
M creativity   .120  .009  .016  -.095  .038  .771
†  .729
†  .177  .447
†  .697
†  - 
 
Note: Inattentiveness = mean rating per item on SNAP-IV; Hyperactivity= mean rating per item on SNAP-IV, Combined= total mean rating per item on SNAP-IV. M= mean 
*p <.004, one tailed. 
† p<.004 two tailed (False Discovery Rate correction applied)       69 
 
   
Inattentiveness  Hyperactivity  Combined 
% 
Short 
delay 
choices 
Commission 
errors 
Fluency  Originality  Elaboration 
Abstractedness 
of titles 
Resistance to 
premature 
closure 
M 
creativity 
score 
Inattentiveness  Male 
Female 
 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Hyperactivity  Male 
Female  .241 
.528
† 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Combined  Male 
Female 
.816
† 
.761
† 
.694
† 
.666
† 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
% Short delay 
choices 
Male 
Female 
.108 
.007 
.203 
.015 
.192 
.012 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Commission 
errors 
Male 
Female 
-.042 
.104 
-.142 
.026 
-.077 
.030 
-.346 
-.071 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Fluency  Male 
Female 
.327 
.198 
.142 
-.194 
.283 
-.141 
-.207 
-.055 
.210 
.018 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
Originality  Male 
Female 
.449* 
-.097 
.186 
-.212 
.402 
-.349 
-.012 
.161 
.168 
-.075 
.901
† 
.695
† 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
Elaboration  Male 
Female 
-.024 
-.042 
-.106 
-.018 
-.076 
-.023 
-.305 
-.236 
-.050 
-.258 
.109 
-.200 
.025 
-.371 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
Abstractedness 
of titles 
Male 
Female 
-.285 
-.043 
.097 
.022 
-.115 
.004 
.360 
-.126 
-.138 
.150 
.020 
-.100 
.024 
-.009 
-.083 
.379 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
Resistance to 
premature 
closure 
 
 
Male 
Female 
.211 
.129 
.198 
-.244 
.233 
-.093 
-.170 
-.267 
.087 
.031 
.529
† 
.708
† 
.531
† 
.439 
.003 
-.070 
-.024 
.069 
- 
- 
       - 
       - 
M creativity 
standard score 
Male 
Female 
.269 
.068 
.222 
-.130 
.297 
-.162 
.025 
-.173 
.044 
.009 
.863
† 
.705
† 
.863
† 
.580
† 
.177 
.130 
.369 
.517
† 
.664
† 
.748
† 
- 
- 
Note: Inattentiveness = mean rating per item on SNAP-IV; Hyperactivity= mean rating per item on SNAP-IV, Combined= total mean rating 
per item on SNAP-IV 
*p <.004, one tailed. 
† p<.004 two tailed (False Discovery Rate correction applied) 
Table 4 
 Spearman’s rank correlations between SNAP-IV scores, percentage short delay choices and creativity subtests split by gender 
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Participants’ originality scores were significantly correlated with fluency scores 
(rs=.797, p<.001) and resistance to premature closure (rs=.472, p<.001).  Participants’ 
fluency scores were significantly correlated with resistance to premature closure (rs=.542, 
p<.001). Correlations between creativity subtests and mean creativity score ranged from rs= 
.177 to .771. No significant correlations were observed between commission errors and 
ADHD symptomology or creativity subtest scores.  No significant correlations were 
observed between percentage delayed reward choice and ADHD symptomology or 
creativity subtest scores.   
The correlational analysis was then conducted for boys and girls separately (Table 
4). In boys, a significant positive correlation was found between inattentiveness and 
originality (rs=.449, p=.004); fluency and originality (rs=.901, p<.001); fluency and 
resistance to premature closure (rs= .529, p<.001) and originality and resistance to 
premature closure (rs=.531, p=.001). Correlations between subtest scores and mean 
creativity score ranged from r=.177 to .863 in boys. In girls, a significant correlation was 
found between fluency and originality (rs=.695, p<.001), and fluency and resistance to 
premature closure (rs=.708, p<.001).  Correlations between subtest scores and mean 
creativity score ranged from r=.130 to .748 in girls.  
For both genders, no significant correlations were found between commission errors 
and ADHD symptomology or creativity subtests. For both genders, no significant 
correlations were found between delay aversion and ADHD symptomology or creativity 
subtests. 
  
2.3.4. Multiple regression analysis 
Given the significant correlation observed between originality and inattentiveness in 
boys, a hierarchical multiple regression was conducted to explore the predictive value of 
ADHD symptomology (inattentiveness and hyperactivity) on originality in boys only. 
Inattentiveness and hyperactivity jointly predicted originality scores in boys (Table 5), 
although inattentiveness was the only predictor to make a significant contribution to this 
model. Indeed, when inattentiveness was considered in isolation at the first step of the 
model, the regression model was more significant. No multivariate outliers were detected 
through reference to estimates of Cooks D and leverage. Multicollinearity was not found to 71 
 
be problematic in this model, indicating that the regression model provided a good fit to the 
data.  Inspection of histograms and normal P-P plots indicate that whilst the assumption of 
normality of residuals was supported, the assumption of homoscedasticity was violated, 
indicating that this model may not generalise beyond the sample. In addition, when Stein’s 
formula
10 was used to cross validate the model, the adjusted R
2 value (=.005) was found to 
be considerably different to the observed value of R
2 (=.189). This suggests that the 
regression model possesses poor cross validity. Similarly, post hoc power calculations 
revealed that this model was underpowered (=.67). 
Table 5 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression for ADHD Symptomology on Originality in Boys.  
  B  SE B  β 
 
95% CI for B 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Step 1           
Inattentiveness  13.748  5.119  .434*  3.308  24.118 
Step 2           
Inattentiveness  13.544  5.664  .428*  1.977  25.110 
Hyperactivity  .708  7.764  .016  -15.148  16.564 
           
Note: Inattentiveness = mean rating per item on Inattentiveness subscale of the SNAP-IV; Hyperactivity = 
mean rating per item on Hyperactivity subscale of SNAP-IV; B= unstandardized b coefficient; SE= standard 
error of b coefficients; β= standardised beta values; CI= confidence interval. R
2 = .189, F(1,31)= 7.213, 
p=.012* for Step 1; R
2 Change= .000 F(2,30)= 3.495, p=.043* for Step 2.*p= <.05  
                                                           
10 Stein’s formula ( as cited in Field, 2009): 
 
where n= number of participants and k= number of predictors 
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2.3.5 Mediational analysis 
Inattentiveness (R
2= .005, F (1,31)=.160, p=.692) and hyperactivity (R
2=.042, F (1, 31) 
= 1.373, p=.250 ) did not significantly predict inhibition separately or together (R
2=.043, F 
(2, 30) =.666, p=.521)  in boys. Inattentiveness (R
2=.023, F (1,31)=.732, p=.399) and 
hyperactivity (R
2=.052, F(1,31)= 1.699, p=202) did not significantly predict delay aversion 
separately or together (R
2=.050, F (2, 30) =.898, p=.418)  in boys.  
Together, these findings violate the first condition of mediational analysis as 
outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986).  No further mediational analyses were therefore 
attempted to account for the observed relationship between ADHD symptomology 
(inattentiveness and hyperactivity) and originality in boys. 
 
 
2.4. Discussion 
The aim of this paper was to explore the putative relationship between ADHD 
symptomology and creativity, using a school age sample. In particular, this study aimed to 
test aspects of the “creative advantage hypothesis”, which set up predictions regarding the 
role of inhibition and delay aversion on creative performance. Specifically, it was 
hypothesised that ADHD symptomology would predict performance on a test of divergent 
thinking and that this would be mediated by differences in inhibition and delay aversion.  
Correlational analysis revealed that when the sample was considered as a whole, 
inattentiveness was not significantly related to any aspect of creativity, which is 
inconsistent with the creative advantage hypothesis and previous research (e.g. White & 
Shah, 2006). Given that gender differences were found on parental ratings of symptom 
severity on the SNAP-IV, it is possible that the above findings may be masking differential 
outcomes for boys and girls. Indeed, when male and females responses were analysed 
separately, boys’ level of inattentiveness was found to be correlated with originality. 
Perhaps the lack of comparable findings in girls could be attributed to the fact that in 
general, girls were rated as being less inattentive than boys, hence making it harder to 
‘detect’ any association between ADHD symptomology and divergent thinking.  73 
 
ADHD symptomology was found to predict originality in boys. Inattentiveness and 
hyperactivity accounted for 18.9% of variance in boys’ levels of originality on the TTCT, 
although inattentiveness was the only predictor which made a significant contribution to 
this model. As boys' levels of inattentiveness increased, levels of originality increased, 
which is consistent with predictions from the creative advantage hypothesis. It is interesting 
to note that significant findings were limited to one subtest of the TTCT in boys: 
originality. Although the importance of originality in creativity is clear, definitions of 
creativity often go beyond the production of novel ideas in emphasising the need for 
original yet functional ideas (Plucker et al. 2004; Sternberg & Lubart, 1991). Whilst the 
TTCT does not explicitly convey to participants the importance of functionality in 
creativity, the Elaboration and Abstractedness of Titles subtests may index participants’ 
ability to develop their creative ideas. Presumably, the ability to refine a creative idea and 
ensure it remains fit for purpose requires the focusing of attention. Therefore, the benefits 
associated with inattentiveness may be limited to one aspect of creativity, originality, at 
least for boys in this sample. Indeed, such a notion is consistent with previous research by 
Abraham et al. (2006), who found that individuals with ADHD were less able to generate 
functional responses on a creative imagery task, but more able to generate original 
responses on a recently activated knowledge task when compared to non-ADHD controls.   
This study also sought to discriminate between two potential mediators of the 
relationship between ADHD symptoms and creativity: inhibition deficits and delay 
aversion. Inhibition was not found to correlate with, or mediate the relationship between, 
ADHD symptomology and originality in boys. This contrasts with predictions made by the 
creative advantage hypothesis and previous research emphasising the role of inhibition 
deficits in creativity (Carson et al. 2003). However, this lack of an effect for inhibition may 
be because participants in the current study did not show significantly elevated levels of 
inhibition deficits. Indeed on average, participants in the current study successfully 
inhibited a Go response to No Go trails on 70% of trials, which is comparable to the 
performance of non-ADHD controls on the same task in Bitsakou et al.’s (2008) study.  
Similarly, delay aversion was not found to correlate with, or mediate the 
relationship between, ADHD symptoms and originality in boys. This finding is inconsistent 
with the tentative prediction put forward in the creative advantage hypothesis. However, it 74 
 
is possible that the adapted delay aversion task was not a reliable measure of delay 
aversion. Indeed, the majority of participants appeared to perform near ceiling level on this 
task, indicating that the task was not sensitive enough to tap delay aversion. Given these 
limitations, such findings remain inconclusive at present. 
In short, the results of this study lend some support for the creative advantage 
hypothesis as ADHD symptomology was found to predict originality in boys only. In 
contrast to the predictions made by the creative advantage hypothesis; no evidence was 
found of the mediating role of inhibition or delay aversion in creativity. However, such 
findings would need to be replicated in future research before any firm conclusions were 
drawn. 
Indeed, these conclusions need to be considered in light of the limitations inherent 
in this study.  Firstly, the small sample size used in this study meant that the regression 
analysis conducted was underpowered. In addition, the significant regression model for 
originality in boys was found to possess poor cross validity. Consequently, the findings of 
this study are unlikely to generalise to the wider population of inattentive boys.  
Secondly, as already indicated the majority of participants demonstrated that they 
were able to tolerate the 10 second delay in the delay aversion task.  Most measures of 
delay aversion specify a delay of between 20 and 30 seconds (Bitsakou et al. 2009), 
although some measures specify a delay of 10 seconds (e.g. Delay Frustration Task, 
Bitsakou et al. 2006).  Future research may benefit from manipulating the length of long 
delay both within this range and outside it, in order to establish an agreed estimate of delay 
likely to balance the trade-off between Type I and Type II errors in delay aversion.  
Thirdly, practical difficulties in recruiting participants meant that participants had to 
be sampled from three different geographical areas. Although participants were recruited 
from the same year group, it was not possible to match pupils on other variables (e.g. 
socioeconomic status, ethnicity, intelligence) across schools which may have influenced 
results.  
Due to evidence in the literature indicating that ADHD medication may be a 
potential methodological confound, parents were advised that if their child was taking 
medication for ADHD then they were not eligible to take part. This exclusion criterion may 
have limited the number of individuals in the sample with ADHD symptomology at the 75 
 
more severe end of the continuum. Given the restricted range of ADHD symptomology in 
the sample, it is possible that the results of the study represent a ‘snapshot’ of the wider 
picture. Perhaps the relationship between ADHD symptomology and divergent thinking is 
not linear but instead follows a reverse U-shaped curve, where inattentiveness confers a 
creative advantage until a threshold of symptom severity is reached. Beyond this point, 
further increases in symptom severity might not be associated with gains in creativity. 
Despite these limitations, the results of this study provide some support for the 
creative advantage hypothesis and suggest some interesting avenues for further research. 
For example, given the finding of gender effects on the relationship between ADHD 
symptomology and aspects of creativity, there is a need to tease out whether this is a 
genuine effect, or limited to the current sample. In addition, it may be interesting to explore 
the generalizability of the current findings to other tests of divergent thinking (such as the 
verbal TTCT) and real world examples of creative achievement in participants.  
Future research would benefit from recruiting individuals across the entire range of 
ADHD symptomology, including those with a clinical diagnosis of ADHD, in order to 
explore whether the relationship between ADHD symptomology and creativity is linear or 
nonlinear. Future studies should also aim to recruit enough participants in order to ensure 
that regression analyses have enough power to detect significant effects.  
Furthermore, given the debate in the literature about the potential moderating role of 
intelligence in creativity (Barron, 1969) and delay aversion as measured by the MIDA 
(Bitsakou et al. 2009), it may be helpful to control for intelligence in subsequent studies in 
order to assess the influence of this variable on creativity in participants with ADHD 
symptomology.  
In short, the findings of this study lend some preliminary support to the creative 
advantage hypothesis, although it is acknowledged that the role of ADHD symptomology 
on creativity was limited to boys only. Such findings have a number of implications for 
teachers and Educational Psychologists. As professionals who work with schools on a 
systemic level, Educational Psychologists are well placed to advise school staff on theories 
of creativity and potentially support  the establishment of  a whole school ethos where 
pupils’ creativity is valued and nurtured. This appears to be particularly important given 76 
 
evidence indicating that teachers do not feel qualified to support pupils’ creativity in the 
classroom. 
Furthermore, the findings of the current study suggest that some pupils with ADHD 
symptomology may experience a degree of success on divergent thinking tasks. Given 
research indicating that pupils high in ADHD symptomology often struggle in the 
classroom (Ek et al. 2011), adapting tasks in order to build on their strengths may boost 
pupils’ intrinsic motivation to complete tasks. The role of teacher expectations on pupils’ 
performance has been explored in the literature (Brophy & Good, 1970), and it seems 
plausible to suggest that reframing aspects of ADHD symptomology in terms of areas of 
potential strength may lead to positive change for these pupils.  
There may also be a role for Educational Psychologists in encouraging teachers to 
incorporate opportunities for creativity in the classroom. One way of doing this could be 
through asking pupils questions such as “how else could we solve this problem?” and “how 
can we make this idea even better?” during class discussion. Other recommendations could 
include ensuring a balance between closed and open-ended tasks in lessons in order to 
develop pupils’ convergent and divergent thinking skills respectively. Techniques such as 
‘thought showers’ and ‘mind maps’ may  help pupils organise their ideas when faced with 
open-ended tasks. Teachers may also wish to incorporate a degree of flexibility in their 
lessons plans in order to provide pupils with opportunities to meet learning objectives in 
myriad ways e.g. through role play, diary entries or other forms of creative expression. It is 
possible that such practice may ultimately increase pupils’ sense of ownership over the 
learning process and engagement in learning. Indeed, in supporting the development of 
pupils’ creativity in school, educational professionals are likely to play a vital role in 
nurturing the creative minds of the future.  
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Appendix A 
  The SNAP-IV Rating Scale (Adapted from Swanson, 1992) 
 
Please provide the following information about your child: 
Pupils’ gender:   M  /  F 
Pupils’ date of birth:  
Nationality:  
For each item, select the box that best describes this child. Put only one  tick per item:  
                              
  Not at 
all 
Just a 
little 
Quite a 
bit 
Very 
much 
1. Often fails to give close attention to details or makes 
careless  mistakes in schoolwork or tasks 
       
 2.  Often has difficulty sustaining attention in tasks or 
play activities  
 
       
3. Often does not seem to listen when spoken to directly   
 
     
4. Often does not follow through on instructions and fails 
to finish schoolwork, chores, or duties 
       
5. Often has difficulty organizing tasks and activities   
 
     
6. Often avoids, dislikes, or reluctantly engages in tasks 
requiring sustained mental effort 
       
 
7. Often loses things necessary for activities (e.g., toys, 
school assignments, pencils, or books)  
       
8. Often is distracted by extraneous (external ) stimuli  
 
       
9. Often is forgetful in daily activities  
 
       
10. Often fidgets with hands or feet or squirms in seat  
 
       
11. Often leaves seat in classroom or in other situations 
in which remaining seated is expected 
       
12. Often runs about or climbs excessively in situations 
in which it is inappropriate 
       
13. Often has difficulty playing or engaging in leisure 
activities quietly 
 
       
14. Often is "on the go" or often acts as if "driven by a 
motor" 
 
       
15. Often talks excessively 
 
       
16. Often blurts out answers before questions have been 
completed  
 
       
17. Often has difficulty awaiting turn  
 
       
18. Often interrupts or intrudes on others (e.g., butts into 
conversations/games)  
       78 
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Appendix C 
 
 
 
 
PARENT OPT-IN CONSENT FORM (Version 2 9/9/11) 
 
Study title: Creativity and attention deficit: the role of inhibition and delay aversion 
 
 
Researcher name: Alexandra Beaven 
Ethics reference:844 
 
 
Dear Parent/Guardian, 
 
     
                                 I would like to introduce myself as a 3
rd Year Trainee Educational 
Psychology student from the University of Southampton. I am conducting a project 
exploring creativity and attention in your child’s school as part of my doctoral dissertation 
and would welcome your child’s participation. 
 
Please read the attached information sheet for more information on the aims of the study 
and if you are happy for your child to participate in the study, please complete and return 
the consent form to [name of school] by [date].  
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
 
 
Alexandra Beaven  
Trainee Educational Psychologist 
University of Southampton 81 
 
Version 2, 9/9/11
 Creativity and attention deficit: the role of inhibition and delay aversion
Please initial the box(es) if you agree with the statement(s):  
I understand that information collected about me during my participation in this study will 
be stored on a password protected computer and that this information will only be used 
for the purpose of this study. All files containing any personal data will be made 
anonymous.
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the Chair of the Ethics 
committee,  School of Psychology, University of Southampton, Southampton, SO17 1BJ. 
(023) 8059 5578. 
 
Where can I get more information? 
You can email the researcher at amb1g09@soton.ac.uk if you have any questions about the 
research project. 
 84 
 
Appendix E 
ASSENT FORM  FOR PUPILS (Version 2, 9/9/11) 
 
 
 
I understand that information collected about me during my participation in this study will 
be stored on a password protected computer and that this information will only be used 
for the purpose of this study. All files containing any personal data will be made 
anonymous.
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Appendix F 
Debriefing Statement for pupils (Version 2, 9/9/11) 
 
Creativity and attention deficit: the role of inhibition and delay aversion 
                                 
The aim of this research was to explore the relationship between attention and creativity in 
a range of pupils of your age. I am interested in whether pupils’ ability to tolerate delay and 
respond to irrelevant information (inhibition) affects this relationship. All pupils range in 
their ability to pay attention to tasks and I chose a range of pupils to take part in my study. 
You may have found it easy or hard to stay focused during the tasks but I’m very grateful 
for your help with this study.   
 
 
The results of this study will not include your name or any other identifying characteristics.  
No deception was used in this study.  
 
If you have any further questions please contact me via email on amb1g09@soton.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Signature ______________________________         Date __________________ 
 
Name ______________________________    
 
If you have questions about your rights as a participant in this research, or if you feel that 
you have been placed at risk, you may contact the Chair of the Ethics Committee, School of 
Psychology, University of Southampton, Southampton, SO17 1BJ. 
Phone:  (023) 8059 5578. 
 
 
Thank you for your participation in this research, 
 
 
 
Alexandra Beaven 
Trainee Educational Psychologist. University of Southampton 86 
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